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Title Power grid recovery after natural hazard impact 
Abstract 
Natural hazards can affect electricity infrastructure, leading to power outages and affecting the resilience of 
society during disaster. This study analyzed the effects of earthquakes, floods and space weather on the power 
grid to identify vulnerabilities and to understand how these natural hazards influence the recovery time of 
electric utilities.  
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Executive summary 
Electricity is the backbone of modern society. It is ubiquitous in the daily lives of European 
citizens and all critical infrastructure systems depend on the reliable delivery of electricity. 
This sector’s regulatory framework spans across energy, civil protection and critical 
infrastructure policies. 
Natural hazards can affect the electricity supply and result in power outages which can 
trigger accidents, bring economic activity to a halt and hinder emergency response until 
electricity supply is restored to critical services. This study aims to elucidate how the 
characteristics of earthquakes, space weather and floods influence the power grid recovery 
time. For this purpose, forensic analysis of the performance of the power grid during 16 
earthquakes, 15 space weather events and 20 floods was carried out.  
The study highlighted that different natural hazards affect the power grid in different ways. 
Earthquakes cause inertial damage to heavy equipment (such as generators and 
transformers) and brittle items (for example ceramics), and ground failure and soil 
liquefaction can be devastating to electric infrastructure assets. Equipment anchoring was 
the most effective mitigation strategy we identified, and site selection can arguably reduce 
the exposure to ground failure. Recovery time is driven by the balance of repairs and 
capabilities. Poor access to damaged facilities, due to landslides or traffic congestion, can 
also delay repairs. In this study the time to restore power supply ranged from a few hours 
to months, but more frequently from 1 to 4 days.   
Floods are commonly associated with power outages. Erosion due to the floodwaters and 
landslides triggered by floods undermine the foundations of transmission towers. Serious, 
and often explosive, damage may occur when electrified equipment comes in contact with 
water, while moisture and dirt intrusion require time-consuming repairs of inundated 
equipment. In contrast to earthquakes, early warning is possible, and enables electric 
utilities to shut off power to facilities in flood zones, therefore minimizing damage. The 
most effective mitigation strategies included elevation, levees and locating critical facilities 
outside the flood zone. Recovery time was driven by the number of needed repairs, and 
site access as repairs cannot start until floodwaters have receded. In this study, power was 
back online from 24 hours up to 3 weeks after the flood. However, longer restoration times 
(up to 5 weeks) were associated with floods spawned by hurricanes and storms. 
Space weather affects transmission and generation equipment through geomagnetically 
induced currents (GICs). In contrast to earthquakes and floods, GICs have the potential to 
impact the entire transmission network. Based on the cases examined in this study, during 
geomagnetic storm conditions some form of abnormal operations conditions or equipment 
damage is likely.  Although some early warning is possible, warning lead times are typically 
very short and existing forecasting capabilities need to be improved to provide transmission 
system operators all the information they need for preparing for a severe event. Delayed 
effects and the potential for system-wide impact were the main drivers of recovery time in 
this study. When damage is limited to tripping of protective devices, restoration time is 
less than 24 hours. However, repairs of damaged equipment may take up to several 
months. 
Other factors affecting the power grid recovery time in the aftermath of natural disasters 
include the resilience of electric power utilities, and the disruption of other critical 
infrastructure (mainly transportation and telecommunications), either as a direct result of 
the natural event, or because of the loss of power supply. 
The following recommendations related to policy, hazard mitigation and emergency 
management emerged from the findings of this study: 
— Whenever possible, risk assessments across different EU policy areas directly or 
indirectly affecting electricity infrastructures should use a consistent set of scenarios. 
— Risk management efforts should be integrated to maximize efficiency. 
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— There should be a transition from hardening system components and facilities to 
building resilience into the power grid to enable the system to function even under 
disaster conditions or recover more quickly. 
— The resilience of the European power grid to extreme space weather should be 
assessed. 
— TSOs/DSOs should develop, implement and exercise outage management plans. These 
plans should be updated when gaps are identified, e.g. in case of climate change. 
— Spare items should be stockpiled to expedite the repair or replacement of key assets 
and equipment. 
— Interoperability among neighboring TSOs/DSOs, and between TSOs/DSOs and 
emergency management organizations should be ensured. 
— Repairs to critical electricity customers should be prioritized.  
Future JRC work will focus on expanding this study to other hazards, including storms. 
Future studies should also take into consideration the potential effects of climate change 
on the frequency of occurrence and intensity of natural hazards, and the cumulative effect 





Disasters create overwhelming demands to affected communities and pose unique 
problems that complicate response efforts. The impact of disasters includes human losses 
(death and injury), widespread destruction of property and livelihoods, environmental 
damage and disruption of infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes systems or assets 
which are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, 
and economic or social well-being of people1. Experience from recent disasters has 
demonstrated that damage to infrastructure adversely affects community resilience. 
The disruption of critical infrastructure systems by natural phenomena may have direct or 
indirect effects. For instance, damage to water and wastewater systems often poses a 
direct threat to public health in a disaster-affected area. Moreover, the disruption of critical 
infrastructure undermines resilience indirectly, by reducing the capability of affected 
communities to respond and recover. For example, the temporary loss of cellular telephone 
service slows down incident response, because many emergency services use cell phones 
for routine and emergency communications. The complex interdependencies among critical 
infrastructure systems often cause cascading disruptions of multiple systems and 
aggravate the post-disaster situation. 
Among critical infrastructure, electric power is a cornerstone of modern economies. 
Electricity is ubiquitous in the daily lives of European citizens and spans across all sectors 
of the European economy. Electricity consumption in the European Union increased by 25% 
between 1990 and 2014 (EEA, 2017). In addition, all critical infrastructure systems 
depend, to a greater or lesser extent, on the reliable delivery of electricity. Conducted 
pursuant to a directive by President Franklin Roosevelt, the United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey estimated that the air raids would have been more effective if they had 
targeted electric generating plants instead of urban and industrial areas (Air University, 
1987). More recent research has highlighted the potential consequences of long-term 
power outages (Petermann et al., 2011; Schmidthaler & Reichl, 2016; OSCE, 2016). 
Furthermore, energy is one of the two critical infrastructure sectors for which Member 
States are required by the European Critical Infrastructure Directive2 to designate critical 
assets and facilities, develop Operator Security Plans and appoint Security Liaison Officers. 
The purpose of this study is to improve the understanding of the impact of natural hazards 
on the power grid. It endeavors to elucidate how the characteristics of certain types of 
natural hazards influence the power grid recovery time. It is intended to inform policy-
making and strategic and operational disaster risk management planning in the European 
Union Member States. 
This report focuses on three types of natural hazards, earthquakes, space weather and 
riverine floods. These hazards were selected based on their prevalence and their potential 
for disrupting the power grid. Floods affect more people than any other hazard. Of the 34 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) Participating States, 30 have included floods in 
their national risk assessment (EC, 2017). Riverine floods are prevalent in Central, Eastern 
and Northern European Countries, while flash floods are common in Southern European 
countries. Both types can result from extreme weather events, which are likely to be 
exacerbated due to climate change. Nineteen UCPM Participating States have identified 
earthquakes in their National Risk Assessments (NRAs). Earthquakes are a major risk in 
South-Eastern Europe, spawned from the subduction zone between the Eurasian and 
African tectonic plates. In addition, 6 countries have included space weather scenarios in 
their NRAs. Despite being more of a threat to Northern European countries and other 
countries in the North, extreme space weather can potentially affect electricity 
transmission networks also at lower latitudes. 
                                          
(1) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical 




Although these natural hazards are highly critical for the power grid, further research is 
warranted to address the vulnerability of electricity networks to other hazards. Future 
research will focus on hazards which affect the power grid either directly, by damaging 
critical components (e.g. storms) or indirectly, by altering the patterns of electricity 
consumption (e.g. heat waves and cold spells). 
This report is structured in five parts. The next chapter sets the context for the study, by 
outlining the profile of the electricity critical infrastructure subsector, including policy and 
regulation in Europe. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in this study. Chapter 4 
discusses the impact of earthquakes, space weather and floods on the power grid, and how 
the type and extent of damage affects recovery time. Chapter 5 describes the impact of 
the power grid’s resilience and of the disruption of other critical infrastructure sectors on 
recovery time. Last, chapter 6 presents recommendations for policy, hazard mitigation and 

























2 Electricity in Europe 
According to the European Critical Infrastructure Directive, electricity is a subsector of the 
Energy Sector, along with oil and natural gas. Electricity assets and components are owned 
by private and public entities, including some energy consumers. This chapter describes 
the key characteristics of the electricity industry, the extensive public/private partnerships 
involved in the subsector, and relevant policies in the European Union. 
2.1 Electric Power Subsector Profile 
Traditionally, the Electricity Subsector includes the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electric power (Figure 1). Although fossil fuels have historically been the 
main electricity generation source, the fraction of electric power produced from these 
traditional power plants has steadily decreased in recent years in favor of renewable energy 
sources. Fossil fuels provide about 50 percent of the total electricity generated in the 
European Union, as shown in Figure 2. Hydroelectric power production plants are 
concentrated in the transalpine range, the Carpathians and the Scandinavian countries, 
and accounted for 12% of total generation in 2016. In the same year, nuclear power plants 
produced 26% of the total electric power. A growing percentage of the EU’s electricity 
generation is coming from wind and other renewable sources, such as geothermal and 
solar. The EC has recently proposed in its Clean Energy for all Europeans package a binding 
EU-level minimum of at least 27% for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU 
by 2030. This translates into 50% of electricity consumed in the EU coming from such 
sources. 
Figure 1. Overview of the traditional electric power system 
 
Source: Adapted from US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force (2004) 
Electricity critical infrastructure assets and facilities are owned by public and private 
entities. In addition, some types of consumers, such as large industrial complexes and 
other critical infrastructure facilities, operate cogeneration plants or generators, usually to 
maintain backup electricity capabilities. A proliferation of distributed energy sources, 
mainly photovoltaics (PV), was recorded during the last decade, even to the low voltage 
level of residential consumers. This trend is expected to continue due to technology cost 
reductions and combined with the electrification of transport, progress in storage 
technologies, and the digitalization of energy (e.g. smart meters coupled with smart 
household appliances and Energy Management Systems). Overall, the electric power 
subsector faces a paradigm change to a much more horizontal (and complex) system 
where end-consumers will play a much more active role. It is noted that consumer 
empowerment is at the core of the EC energy policy as expressed in the Clean Energy 
Package for all Europeans. 
6 
Electricity generated at bulk power plants is moved using high-voltage transmission lines. 
Transmission substations located inside generation plants use Generation Step-Up (GSU) 
transformers to increase the voltage. These substations link each generation station with 
one end of a transmission line. Increasing the voltage decreases power loss due to 
resistance, therefore allowing electric power to be carried efficiently over long distances. 
In Europe, the voltage of transmission lines ranges between 110 and 750 kV. At the other 
end of a transmission line, another substation uses step-down transformers to reduce 
transmission voltages and links the transmission line with the electricity distribution 
system. 
The transmission network also links adjacent national grids, creating interconnections 
which span across multiple countries. Europe, especially in the North-West forms a highly 
interconnected meshed Grid. Interconnections increase the opportunity for trade of 
electricity, increasing the overall socio-economic benefit, and enhance security of supply 
by enabling sharing of resources in cases of system stress. On the other hand, the highly 
meshed grid in Europe necessitates close collaboration between the Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs), since a fault in a part of the network can quickly propagate throughout 
the system and lead to cascading failures. The EC has set an obligatory goal to reach an 
interconnection level in each EU Member State of at least 10% by 2020 and 15% by 2030. 
The distribution system runs at lower voltages (down to 240V in continental Europe) and 
delivers electricity to individual customers. It includes distribution lines and distribution 
substations, which use transformers to gradually step down the voltage before it reaches 
the end customers. Medium and low voltage distribution circuits are often used as an 
economical way of connecting distribution lines with transmission lines. They include 
substations which step down the voltage from transmission lines and send it to distribution 
substations located in towns and neighborhoods. Some consumers who require higher 
voltages than the domestic power supply, such as large industrial facilities, may plug 
directly in the subtransmission system. 
Figure 2. 2016 EU-28 Electricity Generation Profile 
 
Source: Eurostat (2017) 
Transmission and distribution system operators use sophisticated monitoring and control 
systems to ensure safe and predictable operation of the power grid. Control centers are 
staffed on a 24/7 basis and accomplish several key functions, including matching electricity 
production with the load, maintaining synchronization of the grid, and maintaining the 
reliability of the grid by bringing online or taking offline key components of the system in 
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response to anticipated or present threats. These centers use Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition Systems (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) to remotely monitor 
the flow of electricity and control equipment such as switches, circuit breakers, 
transformers and generators. Smart grid technologies are being increasingly employed to 
improve the reliability, flexibility, efficiency and sustainability of the electric power grid. 
2.2 Policy and regulation 
2.2.1 Current legal context at the EU level 
Currently, risk reduction and crisis management regulations in the electricity subsector at 
the EU level are scattered over different legal acts. Following is a short discussion of the 
most important points. 
At the pan-European level, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E) produces seasonal outlooks (6-month periodicity – summer & winter 
outlooks) according to the requirements of Article 8 of the Electricity Regulation3. These 
assessments explore the main risks identified within the seasonal period and the Member 
States that could be affected, and highlight the capabilities of neighbouring countries to 
contributing to the generation/demand balance in critical situations. Moreover, ENTSO-E 
analyses retrospectively electricity crises affecting many Member States, such as the cold 
spell of January 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2017). It should be noted, however, that the seasonal 
outlooks in their current form are mainly focused on generation adequacy, i.e. whether 
there will be adequate available generation capacity to cover the forecast demand. They 
do not cover a full vulnerability analysis that fully accounts for extreme weather conditions, 
natural hazards, simultaneous failures in the grid or man-made hazards (e.g. fuel 
shortages and malicious attacks).  
At the Member State level, risk preparedness is only implicitly set in Article 4 of the 
Electricity Directive4 and Article 7 of the Security of Supply (SoS) Directive5 which impose 
the general obligation to Member States to monitor security of supply and to publish every 
two years a report outlining their findings, as well as any measures taken or envisaged to 
address them. Crisis management is set by the SoS Directive and Article 42 of the 
Electricity Directive. Finally, regarding cybersecurity, an increasingly important issue given 
the digitalisation of the power system, the NIS Directive6 provides the horizontal framework 
to boost the overall level of network and information security across the EU.  
The success, especially in terms of harmonisation, of the above legal frameworks is rather 
debatable. A review of the state of risk preparedness in the area of security of electricity 
supply (VVA Europe and Spark Legal Network, 2016) showed significant discrepancies 
among Member States in a number of issues, including the competent authorities that 
undertake the national risk assessments, the types of risks assessed and the time-horizon 
examined, the development (or not) of comprehensive risk preparedness plans, the 
responsibilities and the strategies for dealing emergency situations. Most importantly 
cross-border effects and the possibility of simultaneous scarcity of generating capacity in 
the neighbouring Member States are rarely taken into account in the national plans. 
Cooperation between Member States is established only at the technical level between 
TSOs, with the notable exceptions of the Nordic countries and to a lesser extent of the 
Pentalateral Energy Forum. However, political decisions, such as market suspension, 
                                          
(3) Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 
(OJ L 51/15, 14.8.2009, p. 15-35). 
(4) Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ L 211/55, 14.8.2009, p. 
55-93). 
(5) Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 concerning measures 
to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment (OJ L 33/22, 4.2.2006, p. 22-27). 
(6) Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for 
a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 94/1, 19.7.2016, 
p. 1–30) 
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export bans and load-shedding activation, are still taken to a significant extent unilaterally. 
This can have substantial negative effects especially under simultaneous electricity crisis 
conditions, as was demonstrated by the cold spell of January 2017. 
Overall, the evaluation of the current legal framework concluded that it has proven 
ineffective in improving the security of supply in Europe (EC, 2016). Given the increased 
interconnected nature of the European power systems, purely national approaches for 
prevention of, preparation for and managing of electricity crises become ineffective. There 
is the need for a harmonized framework for defining the necessary level of security of 
supply per country, to compare the expected level of security of supply between countries, 
to assess risks and to define measures for their mitigation taking fully into account cross-
border impacts or simultaneous crisis situations. 
On cybersecurity, the NIS Directive provides only a general legal framework. A detailed 
and harmonized approach specific to the electricity sector is still lacking. 
2.2.2 Policy initiatives 
The ongoing regulatory effort on the Internal Energy Market relates with risk preparedness. 
Three network codes are of main importance on the subject: the CACM Guideline7, the SO 
Guideline8, both already in force, and the Network Code on Emergency & Restoration9, still 
in Comitology. These codes establish a harmonized framework of technical procedures and 
the interoperability of rules at the EU level regarding the basic structure of the electricity 
markets, the allocation of interconnector capacity in both normal and emergency 
situations, the rules that should be followed by TSOs for the secure operation of the 
System, the interoperability between the Member States of the System Defense Plans, and 
the remedial actions followed in emergencies and in the restoration of the system. In 
addition, they provide for the creation and the allocation of specific responsibilities to 
Regional Security Coordinators (RSCs) that should cover geographically the whole 
European Union. In the Clean Energy for all Europeans package, it is proposed that RSCs 
are further delegated with more tasks and become Regional Operational Centers (ROCs). 
Even though these network codes contribute to the creation of a harmonized framework 
for assessing security of supply and coordinate remedial actions in both emergency and 
system recovery situations, there is still a gap in both their scope and content. First, they 
essentially remain at the technical level, leaving room for disparities when highly political 
decisions, such as market suspension, export bans and load shedding are to be made. 
Second, even though the codes provide for periodic assessments of security of supply in 
different time-horizons, these remain basically within the context of generation adequacy, 
and are not a full vulnerability analysis. 
Due to the above regulatory gap, the European Commission has proposed a Regulation on 
risk-preparedness10 in the context of the Clean Energy for all Europeans package. The 
Regulation aims for the creation of a general legislative framework for the prevention, 
preparation for and management of electricity crisis situations. A short description of the 
main provisions of the Regulation on risk-preparedness is given in Box 1. 
                                          
(7) Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management (OJ L 197/24, 25.7.2015, p. 24-72). 
(8) Draft Commission Regulation establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation (final), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/SystemOperationGuideline%20final%28provisional
%2904052016.pdf (accessed July 14, 2017) 
(9) Draft Commission Regulation establishing a network code on electricity emergency and restoration (final), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/nc_er_ener_vs_13_ecbc_on_24_25-10-
2016finalasvotedfor_publication.pdf (accessed July 14, 2017) 
(10) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on risk-preparedness in the electricity 
sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC (COM/2016/0862 final – 2016/0377 COD), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1d8d2670-b7b2-11e6-9e3c-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed July 14, 2017) 
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Box 1. The proposal for a Regulation on risk-preparedness in electricity sector 
Creation of a Competent Authority 
First, the proposal provides for the creation of a competent authority on risk preparedness 
in each Member State, which should be either a national governmental or a regulatory 
body. 
Risk Assessments 
At the regional level, ENTSO-E is delegated with the task to develop a methodology and 
identify electricity crisis scenarios every three years or sooner if needed. The latter task 
can be delegated by ENTSO-E to the Regional Operational Centers. The assessment should 
cover at least the following risks (Article 5 of the Regulation): 
— Rare and extreme natural hazards 
— Simultaneous accidental hazards 
— Consequential hazards including fuel shortages 
— Malicious attacks (including cyber-attacks) 
The risks should be ranked according to impact and probability, and the developed 
methodology should take into full account the interaction and correlation of risks across 
borders as well as simultaneous crisis scenarios. 
On a national level, Member States are obliged every three years, or sooner if needed, to 
identify the most relevant electricity crisis scenarios, which should be consistent with the 
respective regional scenarios. In addition, Member States will inform the Commission and 
the Electricity Coordination Group (ECG) about possible risks they see in relation to the 
ownership of infrastructure relevant for security of supply (Article 7.3 of the Regulation). 
Apart from the 3-year risk assessments, short-term adequacy assessments (seasonal, 
week-ahead and intraday) have to be done with a more limited scope of covered risks. 
Specifically, the minimum requirements for these short-term adequacy assessments are 
(Article 8.1 of the Regulation): 
— Covering the uncertainty of inputs in respect to grid and generation capacity, demand, 
and weather induced phenomena including the variability of production from Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES) 
— The probability of occurrence of a critical situation 
— The probability of occurrence of a simultaneous crisis situation 
The methodology for all short-term adequacy assessments will be developed by ENTSO-E, 
which will also conduct the seasonal outlooks, possibly in collaboration with the ROCs. The 
latter will conduct the week-ahead and intraday adequacy assessments for their respective 
regions. 
Risk-preparedness plans 
Based on the 3-year regional and national electricity crisis scenarios, the competent 
authority of each Member State shall establish a risk-preparedness plan. The plan will be 
effectively divided in two parts, one consisting of national measures and one covering 
regional measures, i.e. measures with a cross-border impact. For improving 
harmonization, the plans should follow a specific template given in the Annex of the 
Regulation for risk-preparedness. It is noted that in the impact assessment of the proposed 
Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector it is contemplated that in practice 
the coordinated regional measures will most probably be designed by the Regional 
Operational Centers (EC, 2016)  
Before adoption, each plan must be submitted to the competent authorities of the other 
Member States in the region and the Electricity Coordination Group for reviewing.   
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A basic principle that the risk-preparedness plans should follow is "market first", i.e. 
markets should be permitted to operate even under scarcity conditions where electricity 
prices spike. Market-suspension should be a measure of last resort. For all non-market 
measures, the trigger, conditions and procedures for their implementation should be clearly 
specified. Additionally, for the coordinated regional measures, legal and financial 
arrangements regarding mutual assistance must be predefined. 
Management of electricity crisis situations 
The national competent authorities are the main responsible parties for managing expected 
or actual electricity crisis situations. The Commission and the ECG should be informed in 
the case of an early warning, while the Commission and the neighboring Member States 
should be informed when a crisis is declared. The actions set out in the risk-preparedness 
plans should be followed to the fullest possible extent, with due respect to the functioning 
of the internal electricity market, both inside the Member State and in other Member 
States. Non-market measures should be activated only in a crisis situation and when all 
options provided by the market have been exhausted. If necessary and possible, Member 
States should offer assistance to each other in order to prevent or mitigate an electricity 
crisis, subject to compensation. 
 
2.2.3 Natural hazards and electric power systems 
In addition to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector discussed in Box 1, the resilience of electric 
power systems against natural hazards is addressed in several other EU policy areas. First, 
Article 6 of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism Decision11 requires all Participating States 
(including all 28 EU Member States plus Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) to develop and regularly update a National 
Risk Assessment. The Commission’s disaster risk assessment guidelines (EC, 2010) require 
that National Risk Assessments should consider the impact of hazards on critical 
infrastructure. Specifically, each single- or multi-hazard risk scenario needs to describe the 
impact of hazards in terms of the costs of infrastructure recovery and disruption of 
economic activities. However, the guidelines leave the choice of methodology to Member 
States. 
Several Member States have identified the potential for natural and man-made hazards 
and threats to disrupt critical infrastructure. Floods are the most prevalent hazard in the 
NRAs submitted until May 2017. Of the 30 Member States which have included flood 
scenarios in their NRAs, 10 have considered that floods may disrupt critical infrastructure. 
Furthermore, of the 19 Member States which have included earthquake scenarios in their 
NRAs, 4 have identified the potential of earthquake damage to critical infrastructure. In 
addition to the loss of critical infrastructure as a secondary effect of identified hazards and 
threats, 24 NRAs discuss primary scenarios of critical infrastructure disruption. These 
scenarios contemplate the potential for disruption to critical infrastructure systems 
irrespective of the underlying cause. Of those NRAs, 20 include scenarios of long-term 
power outage (EC, 2017; Krausmann et al., 2016). 
Besides the requirement to conduct national or subnational disaster risk assessments 
under the UCPM, several other sectoral policies address the potential for critical 
infrastructure disruption resulting from natural hazards. The Floods Directive12 requires 
Member States to develop flood-specific risk analyses considering, among others, the 
consequences of scenario floods to the economy and the environment. The Water 
                                          
(11) Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 347/924, 20.12.2013, p. 924–947) 
(12) Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment 
and management of flood risks (OJ L 288/27, 6.11.2007, p. 27–34) 
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Framework Directive13 advances the protection of water resources as a mitigation measure 
against floods and droughts. Floodwater damage to critical infrastructure systems can be 
a major contributor to the cost of floods. Droughts can reduce the output of hydroelectric 
power plants, but also of thermoelectric power plants, which require large quantities of 
water for cooling. 
Two policy areas are explicitly related to power generation. The Seveso III Directive14 deals 
with hazardous materials in fixed sites. Industrial facility operators are required to submit 
a safety report detailing the risk from hazardous materials releases from various scenarios. 
The Directive explicitly indicates natural hazards must also be considered as initiating 
events in the analysis of the risk from hazardous materials releases. Fuel storage depots 
are located adjacent to or inside thermoelectric power plants to ensure a steady supply to 
generators. When tank farms are inside a power plant, the facility may be subject to the 
Seveso III Directive, depending on the amount of hazardous substances stored onsite. The 
Nuclear Safety Directive15 requires Member States to take measures to protect nuclear 
power plants from a wide range of hazards and threats, including natural hazards. Although 
risk analysis techniques used in industrial and nuclear facilities are nearly identical, safety 
requirements for nuclear facilities are generally much more stringent. 
Last, the European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) Directive, focusing on energy and transport, 
explicitly requires Member States to designate ECIs based on the potential impact of the 
disruption of critical infrastructure systems, expressed in terms of casualties, and economic 
and public effects. Each designated ECI shall develop an Operator Security Plan (OSP), 
which needs to include an analysis of the risk of disruption from major threat scenarios 
and outline prevention and protection measures. Despite the multi-risk orientation of the 
ECI Directive, efforts have so far focused on threats from terrorist or other malicious 
attacks. 
                                          
(13) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327/1, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73) 
(14) Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 
96/82/EC (OJ L 197/1, 24.7.2012, p. 1–37) 
(15) Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a 
Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 219/42, 25.7.2014, p. 42–52) 
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3 Methodology and definitions 
The research design for this study was predominantly purposeful. It focuses on disruptions 
of the critical electricity infrastructure subsector caused by selected natural hazards, and 
it explores the relationship between recovery time and hazard type. The study was data-
driven, using an inductive approach based on the analysis of power grid disruptions due to 
earthquakes, space weather and floods. 
Several databases provide information on disasters and their impact. Examples include 
GDACS (2017), a cooperation framework between the United Nations and the European 
Commission, and DMIS (2017), developed by the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies. These and other databases include near-real time data and 
archive records of disasters around the world, including information on lifesaving needs, 
critical infrastructure, critical services, risk from secondary/associated hazards and reports 
on the number of affected individuals. However, the information in these databases is 
intended for emergency managers and lacks the technical details required to assess the 
damage to lifelines. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, data was collected from the open technical 
literature, field survey reports and research papers addressing the performance of lifelines 
in the face of earthquakes, space weather and floods. This exercise produced records of 
16 earthquakes, 15 space weather events and 20 floods, listed in the Annex. Due to a 
scarcity of publicly available data, the impacts of floods caused by diverse events such as 
extreme rainfalls, storm surge etc. were included in this study. The dataset scope is 
worldwide, with a view to maximizing efficiency by capturing lessons from a wide range of 
events. 
Electric power systems are designed and built after the architecture discussed in section 
2.1, but they differ in configuration, output, frequencies and voltages. The power networks 
of most EU Member States are part of the European synchronous grid, which uses a 
frequency of 50 Hz. In the Americas and part of Asia, the power line frequency is 60 Hz. 
The output and voltage of the transmission and distribution grid vary among countries. 
Most European countries use 220 or 230 V for the Low Voltage distribution component of 
the grid, whereas most of the Americas use 110 or 120 V. The equipment and devices used 
by power grids depend to a large extent on the frequency, voltage and output of the 
network, as well as on their position in the network architecture. For instance, large power 
transformers are design-built based on their position in the transmission system. 
Where applicable, this study took into consideration the effect of equipment design on 
earthquake, space weather and flood vulnerability, with a view to identifying the design 
characteristics which may affect the level of damage of critical equipment16. In addition, 
network design features, such as configuration, voltage and frequency, were accounted for 
in the analysis of the damage to individual components and the disruption of the power 
grid generated by natural hazards. 
Nuclear power plants are a significant component of power generation in several EU 
Member States and other countries. Although civilian nuclear reactors are primarily used 
for research and electric power generation, they are typically not considered as part of the 
critical energy infrastructure sector. Because of their military implications and the 
potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear accidents, nuclear power plants are part 
of a separate critical infrastructure sector and are subject to higher standards of safety and 
security. For instance, most countries require nuclear reactors to withstand much stronger 
earthquake loads than residential buildings or hospitals. However, non-safety related 
(NSR)17 equipment and buildings may not be subject to these requirements. In this study, 
only damage to NSR equipment and buildings was considered, where available, and only 
                                          
(16) Here, “critical equipment” refers to equipment and devices the failure of which may prolong recovery time. 
(17) In the nuclear energy sector, “safety-related” refers to equipment, systems or buildings which must remain 
functional during and following design-basis events. Examples of safety-related functions include shutting 
down a nuclear reactor and maintaining it in a safe-shutdown condition (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
2017). 
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to the extent that the equipment was comparable to that used in non-nuclear power plants. 
Examples include GSU transformers and switchyards located in or adjacent to nuclear 
power plants. 
The systems-based visualization of the power grid discussed in section 2.1 was used as an 
initial abstraction to guide data collection and analysis. Information about the performance 
of the power grid to the events in our dataset was recorded in three tiers, each 
corresponding to another level of decomposition (Table 1). 
Table 1. Data recorded  
Tier Level of decomposition Information recorded 
1 The power grid as a system Power grid behavior 
Effect on population 




2 Generation, transmission 
and distribution subsystems 
Damage and recovery time for each 
subsystem 




Damage to structures 
Damage to equipment 
Damage to piping 
Local response 
Recovery time 
Lessons learned (not captured under Tier 1) 
 
The majority of the records in the resulting dataset were categorical, but numerical data 
was considered whenever feasible and available. For instance, information about damage 
to individual facilities, such as substations (Tier 3), was correlated with the peak ground 
acceleration (earthquakes) or water level height (floods) to which the facility was exposed, 
whenever this information was available. When the location of the facility was available, 
shake maps or flood maps were overlaid on a GIS application to determine the peak ground 
acceleration or water level the facility was exposed to. 
The level of detail varied across the reports used for this study. The information in most 
reports was sufficient to establish the type of damage and the failure mechanism. In 
addition, several sources included an indication of the consequences to the population and 
other critical infrastructure sectors, response strategy, as well as repair and/or recovery 
time. The affected population was typically reported as the proportion of customers or 
households where the hazard impacts were observed. However, the diversity in grid 
architecture made it difficult to establish cause-and-effect between the power grid recovery 
time and the severity of damage to specific subsystems or components. 
In addition, there are inconsistencies in recovery time reporting. First, not all sources 
reported recovery time. Second, different definitions and indicators of recovery were used 
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by each reporting source. Some sources defined recovery as the restoration of service to 
the population affected by a power outage, while others as the repair of the power grid or 
subsystems to its pre-disaster state. Last, most sources reported the time to achieve a 
different fraction of complete recovery, such as a percentage of the affected population 
with restored service, or a percentage of power generation. 
Two power grid recovery thresholds were used in this study. The first threshold 
is the restoration of power supply to customers. Both domestic and industrial 
customers were considered, based on available information. This threshold includes efforts 
directed at temporary repairs or workarounds, as well as the use of backup generators. 
The progress of recovery in this case is usually reported in terms of the percentage or 
number of customers with power supply, or the quantity of power supplied, expressed in 
power units or as a percentage of pre-earthquake supply. The second threshold is the 
complete repair of the network, so that temporary solutions, including 







4 Impact of natural hazards on the electric power system 
Natural hazards, such as earthquakes, floods and space weather events, cause many 
different types of damage to electricity lifelines. The recovery time may be prolonged 
compared to failures not generated by natural events, because multiple systems may be 
affected simultaneously. This chapter outlines the type of damage incurred to power grid 
components due to earthquakes, floods and space weather, and describes how the level 
and extent of damage affects recovery time. 
4.1 Earthquakes 
Power outages are a common occurrence during and after major earthquakes. Electricity 
is typically interrupted during or immediately after the shake. The epicentral area is 
affected, but adjacent areas may also suffer outages. The duration of the outages in any 
area is a function of the level of damage to the substations and power lines which serve 
the area. Following the earthquake, power is restored progressively. Depending on the 
intensity of ground motion and the level of damage, the duration of the blackout 
for most customers may range from a few hours to months. In this study, except 
for the most severe cases, it took between 1 and 4 days to restore full power. However, 
customers in remote or poorly accessible areas may experience longer blackouts. Rolling 
or intermittent blackouts are not uncommon, and aftershocks may also cause blackouts 
after power has been restored. 
4.1.1 Effect of the level and type of damage on recovery time 
Earthquakes cause widespread structural damage to power generation, transmission and 
distribution subsystems. Structural failures may result from earthquake loading or be 
secondary to ground failure. Structural damage results from the response of structures 
and equipment to strong seismic ground motion. The following is a discussion of the type 
and severity of damage to buildings, equipment, and transmission and distribution lines. 
Buildings in electric power networks house control rooms and protect heavy equipment, 
such as turbines and transformers. Most buildings in this study were steel-frame, 
reinforced concrete frame or wall, masonry (reinforced or unreinforced), or mobile 
structures. Electricity utility buildings are relatively short, from one to three stories high, 
which improves their seismic performance. Multi-story buildings may not perform as well, 
especially if heavy equipment is located on the upper floors. Electricity utility buildings 
have performed quite well in earthquakes in this study. Of the 39 facilities (substations 
and power plants) included in this study, which were subjected to peak ground 
accelerations (PGA) between 0.15g and 0.97g, severe or catastrophic structural damage 
to buildings was noted in only 5 cases. In two of the cases, PGA was 0.69g and above. In 
the remaining three cases, building damage was caused by ground failure (landslide, 
liquefaction, slope failure). However, in other instances, well-engineered buildings exposed 
to higher PGAs without soil liquefaction suffered less damage. For instance, the Devers 
Substation was exposed to 0.97g during the Palm Springs, CA earthquake of 1986, the 
strongest ground motion in this study. The control building was designed to the Uniform 
Building Code of the late 1960s and suffered no structural damage (EPRI, 1988). Severe 
or catastrophic structural building damage may increase recovery time as it 
affects critical equipment contained in or next to the affected buildings. In 
addition, debris from collapsed buildings may damage adjacent equipment. Less than 
severe structural damage had no impact on recovery time in this study. 
The equipment contained in buildings was often more vulnerable to dynamic horizontal 
loading than building structures in this study. Control buildings include computers, network 
racks, electrical panels, file cabinets, HVAC equipment and battery racks. These and other 
equipment items are heavy, have tall and slim shapes, and rest on small surfaces, which 
makes them particularly vulnerable to strong ground motion. Unanchored equipment 
frequently topples and/or falls from racks and tables. The risk of toppling or falling 
increases with the height and decreases with the base diameter. For example, several 
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unanchored or partially anchored electrical control and instrumentation cabinets with an 
aspect ratio (H/D) greater than 3 overturned during the Spitak, Armenia earthquake of 
1988 (EPRI, 1991). Anchoring successfully mitigates equipment toppling and 
falling hazards. In this study, anchored equipment consistently performed better than 
unanchored equipment, and withstood relatively strong ground motion without serious 
damage. For example, all electric cabinets and racks in the Devers Substation control house 
were anchored when the Palm Springs, CA earthquake hit in 1986. As a result, they 
suffered no damage during the 0.97g strong ground motion (EPRI, 1988). 
Batteries providing emergency power to protective equipment are especially vulnerable to 
this type of failure. They are relatively important because they provide backup power to 
protective equipment and control room information and communication systems. 
Unanchored batteries may slide and topple, while anchored batteries generally remain 
undamaged. 
Large Power Transformers (LPTs) and other heavy equipment suffer a lot from inertial 
seismic loading. Depending on the intensity of ground motion, the damage from rocking 
may range from slight to catastrophic. The slightest form of damage in this study was 
tripping of equipment protection devices because of vibration. The units are inspected and, 
if there is no additional damage, reset and re-energized within less than 24 hours after the 
earthquake. 
The response of heavy equipment to stronger rocking depends on the type of foundation 
supports. LPTs, Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and turbines may break off from 
their foundations and tilt, topple or move horizontally. Tilting or toppling may also drain 
transformer oil. The earthquake load is distributed in proportion to the relative stiffness of 
the resisting members. Therefore, anchoring and base-isolation are successful hazard 
mitigation options: in this study, anchored or base-isolated heavy equipment withstood 
PGAs of up to 0.2g without significant damage. However, anchoring is not a panacea, and 
our study included cases with severe damage at a PGAs of 0.35g. Heavy equipment, such 
as LPTs and turbine units, is often critical for the power grid. Unless spares are available, 
damage to this type of equipment may be the major determinant of recovery time. 
Mounting heavy equipment on rails was a controversial hazard mitigation technique in this 
study. Rail-mounted transformers have less chance of toppling and can absorb energy by 
sliding. Although sliding provides ductility, excessive sliding has other problems. In this 
study, there was only minor damage to rail-mounted transformers that slid up to 50 cm or 
fell off the rails. However, excessive movement caused damage to elements attached to 
the transformers, such as bus bars, lighting arrestors and electrical connections.  
Rigid connections are particularly vulnerable to seismic forces (Krausmann et al., 2011). 
Heavy equipment attached to transformers, such as radiators and oil tanks may be 
detached or drained. On the other hand, elements connected with flexible couplings suffer 
less damage. For instance, two large radiators attached to a large power transformer at 
the Kariwa Substation suffered no damage during the Niigataken-Chuetsu-Oki, Japan 
earthquake of 2007. The radiators were supported independently of the transformer, but 
on the same foundation slab. The transformer was connected to the radiators with flexible 
couplings. Because of soil liquefaction, the foundation slab tilted, but there was no damage 
to neither the transformer nor the radiators (Tang and Schiff, 2007). 
Simple repairs, such as refilling oil tanks, takes two or three days. However, more complex 
works may require up to two weeks if conducted onsite, or considerably more time if the 
equipment needs to be transported to a factory or repair facility. 
Switchyards are the most vulnerable part of electric power substations and facilities. They 
are often critical power grid nodes and provide essential connectivity between power 
generation, transmission and distribution systems. Switchyard equipment includes circuit 
breakers, transformers and disconnect switches, all of which use ceramic columns for 
insulation. These slender and brittle components suffered the most severe earthquake 
damage among all other equipment categories in the cases reviewed in this study. Ceramic 
columns typically break off at the lower third of their height, near the connection to more 
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ductile elements. Widespread damage to the switchyard is a common occurrence. 
Ceramic components of heavier equipment, such as bushings and surge arrestors, are also 
fractured in a similar manner. These failures usually result from seismic excitation or 
tension forces applied to equipment terminations due to limited cable slack, hanging 
equipment (e.g. wave traps) or rocking of adjacent equipment. Supporting ceramic 
columns was found to be a relatively effective hazard mitigation technique in this 
study. Laterally supported ceramic elements suffered consistently less damage. Despite 
the widespread damage inflicted to switchyards by earthquakes, ceramic components are 
relatively inexpensive compared to buildings and heavy equipment, and electric utility 
operators usually maintain supplies of spares. In addition, replacement parts can be 
purchased relatively easily and quickly. Therefore, switchyard repairs depend on manpower 
more than on expensive equipment (i.e. they are more labor-intensive) and the impact of 
this type of damage on recovery time is a function of the criticality of the affected 
substation and the manpower required for repair. For instance, in the aftermath of the 
Luchan, China earthquake on April 20, 2013, a crew of 110 repaired a severely damaged 
substation switchyard in 3 days (Eidinger, Tang and Davis, 2014). 
Next to generation facilities and substations, transmission towers are also highly vulnerable 
to earthquake forces. Transmission tower damage was recorded in nearly all earthquakes 
in this study. Transmission towers are lightweight and slender structures, which have little 
inertia but provide for little damping. The bearing structure is typically a three-dimensional 
truss with cold-formed steel section members. The most frequent earthquake failure modes 
are tower collapse or permanent drift, and deformations of tower members and/or legs. 
Inertial force and ground failure are the most typical causes of damage. The impact of the 
loss of a single transmission tower or a single line depends to a large extent on the 
configuration of the network, as discussed in section 5.1. The replacement of a single 
transmission tower may take about 10 days, provided that the site is accessible 
by road. However, several workarounds have been used to temporarily support critical 
transmission towers. Examples include using mobile construction cranes or prefabricated 
towers, which may also be airlifted to the site and then assembled. Leaning towers may 
also be supported with guy-lines. 
Earthquake damage to the subtransmission and distribution subsystems is similar to that 
of the transmission network. Electricity distribution systems are particularly vulnerable to 
seismic forces and suffer extensive damage in major earthquakes, affecting many 
customers over wide areas. However, this type of damage is not a major determinant of 
the entire grid recovery time for three reasons. First, MV (distribution) and LV (distribution) 
circuits are arranged in grids. Therefore, in case of a loss of a small number of lines, power 
can be rerouted by switching to a backup configuration. In case of more widespread 
damage, electricity supply may be restored by repairing a small number of critical nodes. 
Second, spare equipment and materials are far less expensive than those of transmission 
systems. Distribution Systems Operators (DSOs) maintain reserve stocks to handle rather 
extensive repairs, while additional items are available on order relatively quickly. Third, 
individual repairs take less time than repairs to components of the transmission assets. 
In addition to direct shaking damage to electricity subsector facilities and system 
components from inertial forces, severe damage results from ground failure18. In this 
study, ground failure was the single most important determinant of the level of 
earthquake damage to the power grid. Ground deformation, including settlement, soil 
liquefaction19 and lateral spread20, may destroy an entire switchyard, and cause severe 
damage to buildings, large transformers and other heavy equipment. Soil liquefaction also 
affects buried cables. Foundation failure is a very common cause of transmission tower 
                                          
(18) The term “ground failure” is used in this report as a general reference to consequences of strong ground 
motion which affect the stability of the ground, such as landslides, liquefaction or lateral spreads. 
(19) Soil liquefaction is a phenomenon whereby the soil temporarily loses strength and acts as a liquid. It usually 
occurs in cohesionless soils with poor drainage, such as sand and gravel. Soil liquefaction often results from 
earthquake shaking, which increases the pore water pressure of the soil and consequently decreases its 
effective stress. The phenomenon is observed as “sand boils” and/or land instability. 
(20) Lateral spread or lateral flow is a landslide occurring on low-angle slopes. 
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damage or loss. Poor foundation support contributes significantly to this type of damage. 
Landslides and rockfalls may also damage or destroy buildings and equipment. Ground 
failure adds considerably to the post-earthquake recovery time, not only because 
of the extent of the damage, but also because of the added work required for repairs. 
Several years may be required to assess damage and complete repairs, while severely 
damaged facilities may have to be abandoned. However, temporary workarounds may help 
to restore power to customers until more permanent solutions are found. 
Fire may also be a secondary earthquake hazard for power grid facilities. In this 
study, there was only one occurrence, in which a GSU transformer caught fire due to soil 
settlement. Although a rare phenomenon, fire can cause severe or catastrophic damage to 
buildings and equipment, and affect entire facilities. The level of damage is a function of 
the underlying cause and the availability of passive and active fire protection. 
The analysis of response strategies also helped to assess the repair time of transmission 
towers and large power transformers, two of the most critical components of the electric 
power network. Table 2 presents rough estimates of the time required to conduct various 
types of repairs, conjectured from information about the response to the earthquakes 
reviewed in this study, supplemented with information from the technical documentation. 
Table 2. Estimated repair time 
Component Repair strategy Repair time 
Transmission Tower 
Replacement 10 days 
Erect temporary tower 1-2 days 
Large Power Transformer 
Inspect, reset and re-energize 14-20 hours 
Refill oil, onsite 2 days 
Minor repair, onsite 1-2 weeks 
Change windings, onsite 3 months 
Replace (no existing spare) 1 year or more 
Replace with spare 5 days 
4.1.2 Damage to individual facilities 
Information regarding the level of damage to individual facilities was available for 11 of 
the 16 earthquakes reviewed in this study. Reports about the damage to 39 facilities, 
including substations and power plants, were analyzed to develop a typology of the impact 
of strong ground motion. Two damage scales were defined, one for buildings and 
structures, and one for equipment (Table 3). 
Figure 3 presents the relative frequency of observation of each level of facility damage in 
this study. The facilities in this sample were exposed to peak ground accelerations ranging 
from 0.15g to 0.97g. The distribution of building damage is skewed to the left, which shows 
that buildings are more likely to suffer minor, moderate or no damage. On the other hand, 
the distribution of equipment damage is less skewed, which indicates that equipment is 





Table 3. Earthquake damage and failure modes  
Damage state Buildings/Structures Equipment 
Slight/Minor — Damage to building contents 
— Nonstructural damage 
— Localized damage to load-
bearing members 
Tripping due to vibration 
Toppling of batteries, control 
panels  
Moderate Stress of load-bearing members 
Failure of a limited number of 
load-bearing members, without 
loss of structural integrity 
Breaking of ceramic elements 
Horizontal displacement or tilting 
of heavy equipment, without 
damage 
Draining of transformer oil 
Severe Failure of load-bearing structure 
members, with compromise of 
structural integrity 
Horizontal displacement or tilting 
of heavy equipment, with 
damage 





Figure 3. Distribution of damage severity per damage level (based on a sample of 39 facilities) 
 
 
Moderate and severe equipment damage typically requires lengthy repairs, during which 
the damaged items are out of service. Even minor building damage may render a building 
unusable for some time, and the repair of buildings with moderate or severe earthquake 
damage takes weeks. However, in case of catastrophic damage, which is relatively 
uncommon for both buildings and equipment, the only option is to replace crippled 
equipment or rebuild collapsed structures. In both cases, recovery time increases 
disproportionately compared to even the most complex repairs. In other words, recovery 
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time in earthquakes seems to be attributable to the widespread moderate and 
severe damage, rather than catastrophic damage to individual buildings and 
equipment. 
4.2 Space weather  
Until recently, space weather was almost unknown to the disaster risk management 
community (MacAlester & Murtagh, 2014). The term ‘space weather’ encompasses a 
variety of phenomena which shape the space environment between the Earth and the Sun. 
It is a function of solar activity and its interaction with the Earth’s geomagnetic field. Most 
of the disruptions caused by space weather result from their interaction with technological 
systems. The power grid is particularly vulnerable to Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs), 
explosions of magnetic field and plasma from the Sun’s corona. As they reach the Earth, 
they cause the terrestrial magnetic field to fluctuate over time, resulting in so-called 
geomagnetic storms and inducing currents in closed loops formed by transmission lines 
connected to the ground through grounding connections (Piccinelli & Krausmann, 2017). 
These Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GICs) affect the power grid and have the 
potential to severely compromise electricity transmission. 
The transmission part of the power grid is the most vulnerable to space weather events. 
Generators may also be affected, but to a lesser extent. Electricity distribution networks 
have higher line resistances and lower voltages, and are relatively immune to GICs. They 
are typically affected by space weather when they lose power supply from the transmission 
or subtransmission lines. 
Power outages resulted from 5 of the 15 space weather events reviewed in this study. Each 
time, power supply was restored in less than 24 hours. However, multiple outages occurred 
during each space weather event. Interruptions of power supply did occur on a regular 
time basis and had different durations. The following sections discuss the impact of 
equipment damage and system-wide effects on the power grid recovery time. 
4.2.1 Equipment damage 
GICs have a lower frequency than the electric power grid, and are referred to as quasi-DC 
currents. High-voltage transformers are vulnerable to GICs because they are not designed 
to handle direct current. The existence of GICs in the transmission network drives LPTs 
into half-cycle saturation21, which increases reactive power22 consumption and injects 
harmonics23 into the system. This response can cause a wide range of problems to LPTs, 
including overheating, damage to the windings, and even fire. The level and extent of 
transformer damage is a major determinant of recovery time in space weather 
events. Harmonics may also affect power generators24, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Minor problems, such as overheating, can be addressed relatively easily, by backing down 
transformers to allow them to cool down. If the level of GIC in the system is low and action 
is taken early enough, damage may be minimal and there may be no interruption at all. 
However, if the level of GIC is higher, or action is not taken promptly, the damage may be 
catastrophic. Overheating may destroy the windings and even set the transformer on fire. 
As in the case of earthquake damage (section 4.1.1), repair time depends on the type of 
damage and repair capabilities. For instance, a transformer with high levels of dissolved 
gasses, which is an indicator of prior GIC-induced stress, may have to be taken out of 
                                          
(21) Half-cycle saturation occurs when a DC or quasi-DC excitation is superimposed to the normal AC cycle of the 
transformer. The magnetic flux is increased during the positive half-cycle of the transformer, resulting in 
overheating of the windings, high winding losses and potential damage to the insulation of the windings. 
(22) Reactive power is power which is absorbed and returned to the system in periodic fluctuations due to the 
phase angle difference between voltage and current in AC circuits. An AC circuit consumes more reactive 
power during a DC or quasi-DC excitation because of the increase in half-cycle flux density. 
(23) Harmonics are AC currents with a different frequency than the frequency of the electricity supply (called 
fundamental frequency). Harmonics result from the superposition of series of sinusoidal waveforms, and their 
frequency is an integer multiple of the fundamental frequency. 
(24) Harmonics flowing into a generator produce an oscillating magnetic field which causes heating of the rotor. 
The generator needs to be taken offline to prevent damage. 
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service until the underlying problem is resolved. Winding change onsite takes 
approximately 3 months, assuming no other damage, but may take twice as long if the 
unit has to be dismounted and transported to a factory or repair service. On the other 
hand, if a transformer is destroyed by very high levels of GIC, then the time to 
replace may be upwards of one year. 
In addition to direct damage, GICs may cause protective relays to trip, therefore taking 
offline transformers, transmission lines, capacitors and circuit breakers. As discussed in 
section 4.1.1, tripping of isolated devices is easy to repair, provided there is no additional 
damage. In the events analyzed in this study, when there was no further damage, power 
supply was restored in less than two hours after the disturbance. However, resetting 
tripped devices may have to wait until the geomagnetic storm and the GICs in the 
system have subsided, in which case the recovery time will be prolonged by the 
duration of the event. Geomagnetic storms are often associated with a series of high-GIC 
events over a period of several days. Several devices may trip during each event. The 
duration of the outage which may or may not result from each event, and the affected area 
are a function of the number and type of the tripped devices, and the network topology. 
In other words, geomagnetic storms may be associated with a series of power 
outages, each with a different duration and affecting another area. 
Besides their wide reach, GICs may cause delayed effects. For instance, in the 
aftermath of the Halloween solar storms of October and November 2003, there was 
repeated damage in the South African power grid after the event. Two transformers 
presented high levels of dissolved gasses in June 2004, seven months after the solar storm, 
and another tripped on a gas detector relay25 in November 2004, one year after the event. 
In all three cases, the damage was traced back to the 2003 solar storm (Gaunt & Coetzee, 
2007). Delayed damage effectively reduces the service life of the equipment and adds on 
the economic burden of the restoration effort. 
Table 4 outlines the damage scale developed for the impact of GICs on equipment. Figure 
4 illustrates the relative frequency of observation of each level of equipment damage. Minor 
and catastrophic damage are predominant. The figure also shows that during 
geomagnetic storm conditions some form of abnormal operating conditions or 
equipment damage is likely, even if only minor. The single event which did not result 
in damage was a short-lived radiation event, not associated with strong geomagnetic 
activity. Tripping of protective relays and fire were the most common failure modes. In 
addition, in at least two cases, damage was discovered several days after the event. 
Because of the high potential for catastrophic damage and the possibility of delayed failure, 
GICs present a particularly insidious threat to electric equipment. 
Table 4. Electrical equipment GIC damage and failure modes 




Moderate Equipment malfunction 
Overheating, without winding damage (transformers) 
Severe Overheating, with winding damage (transformers) 
Catastrophic Fire 
                                          
(25) Gas detector relays, or Buchholz relays, are safety devices designed to electrical equipment from failures of 
dielectric material. When mounted on oil-filled transformers, they are sensitive to the accumulation of gasses 
produced from the decomposition of the oil, which may occur as a result of GIC-induced stress. In these 
cases, these relays are designed to disconnect the transformer before the damage becomes severe. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of damage severity per damage level (based on a sample of 14 events) 
 
4.2.2 System-wide impact 
The biggest threat to the power grid from space weather events stems from the 
potential for system-wide impact. The greatest threat from a space weather event to 
the electric power system is voltage collapse, which may result from the combination of 
extreme reactive power consumption and the loss of reactive power support devices. The 
1989 Quebec blackout is referred to as the canonical example of an extended blackout 
caused by a solar storm. Although the intensity of the geomagnetic storm was significantly 
smaller than the 1859 Carrington event, the worst geomagnetic storm on record, the 
response timeline provides insight into the power grid recovery time in case of voltage 
collapse. Following the Quebec blackout, it took 9 hours to restore 83% of the pre-incident 
power supply. While repairs were being made, power was rerouted through 
interconnections to help restore electricity to customers. Damaged equipment was 
progressively repaired and put back into service, but the process took at least nine months 
(Figure 5). The Hydro-Quebec system is not part of the Eastern Interconnection, which 
extends from Central Canada to Florida, and from the Atlantic coast to the east foot of the 
Rocky Mountains. Because Hydro-Quebec is operated as a standalone, asynchronous 
system, the disruption did not propagate into the Eastern Interconnection. Had the 
disturbance been caused by a Carrington-level event and allowed to spread to the Eastern 
Interconnection, the power outage would likely be longer and affect a much wider area, 
and the recovery time would likely be considerably longer, as well. In fact, there is concern 
that an extreme geomagnetic storm could take out significant parts of the US power grid, 
causing ripple effects in all sectors, with an estimated societal and economic cost of 1-2 
trillion $US in the first year, and 4-10 years to full recovery (US National Research Council, 
2008). Unfortunately, the data and methodology used for this assessment were not 
disclosed. 
In addition to voltage collapse, one of the most important threats arising from GICs is the 
potential for simultaneous damage to multiple high-voltage transformers. Natural disasters 
are notorious for crossing national and jurisdictional borders, but a single extreme space 
weather event may affect countries in different continents at the same time. Of the 14 
space weather events reviewed in this study, 4 affected more than one country. For 
instance, the Halloween storms of October-November 2003 affected electricity networks in 
the US, Sweden, South Africa and the UK. The Carrington solar storm of 1859, used as the 
canonical extreme space weather event, affected telegraph services in Canada, the US, 
Norway, Sweden, France, the UK, Belgium and Australia. This type of effect can be a major 
determinant of recovery time because of the long lead time required to build and replace 
a large power transformer. LPTs are designed for a specific location of the system, and 
every device is unique in this sense. Because of their specificity and high cost, it is difficult 










Figure 5. Power grid recovery timeline following the 1989 Quebec blackout 
 
Source: Bolduc, 2002 
As discussed in section 4.2.1, moderate repairs, such as changing the windings, may take 
3 months to finish onsite, or twice as long if the transformer needs to be transported to a 
distant repair facility. However, GICs from geomagnetic storms may damage multiple 
LPTs located in different facilities in several countries within minutes. In addition, 
global repair capabilities are finite; therefore it may not be possible to conduct repairs 
concurrently. In addition, the design, manufacture and testing of a new LPT takes between 
12 and 18 months. There are a handful of qualified manufacturers, most located in Eurasia. 
Therefore, a strong geomagnetic storm affecting multiple transformers could rapidly 
overwhelm global production capabilities and significantly prolong the recovery of the 
electricity grid in several countries. 
4.2.3 Early warning and emergency response 
Notwithstanding the potential for system-wide damage, power companies and TSOs can 
take protective measures if provided with early warning. Current forecasting capabilities 
do not allow to predict the timing and intensity of each event with much lead time. 
Geomagnetic storms exhibit some seasonality, and they generally occur during the 
maximum of the 11-year solar magnetic activity cycle. However, space weather events 
have occurred during the solar minimum as well. Despite the lack of medium-term 
prediction capabilities, early warning of an impending geomagnetic storm is possible. A 
watch is issued as soon as an Earth-directed CME is detected, providing advance warning 
1-3 days before it hits the Earth. However, fast-moving CMEs can reach the Earth is as 
little as 17 hours. In either case, the warning would include the CMEs estimated time of 
arrival to Earth, but not the orientation of its magnetic field. The latter is a critical piece of 
information, because CMEs with strong southward-oriented magnetic fields are the most 
destructive. The orientation of an incoming CME is only known once it is detected by the 
ACE spacecraft, which provides a 15- to 45-minute warning before the storm reaches Earth 
(Krausmann et al., 2016). An alert is issued when magnetometers on the earth’s surface 
pick up the storm. 
The early warning provided by this suite of watch, warning and alert messages gives 
electric power companies and TSOs some time to react, but comes with two drawbacks. 
First, it bears the same uncertainty of terrestrial weather early warning. Currently, the 
orientation of an incoming CME can only be determined 15 to 45 minutes before it hits the 
Earth. In addition, the calculations to determine which device may be affected given a 
specific CME take time, which is not available. However, risk assessments conducted before 
a space weather event takes place can reveal which equipment items are most vulnerable 
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to GICs, so that protective measures can be targeted to the most critical part of the 
network. Second, electric power companies and TSOs require lead times of ideally 2 to 4 
days to take protective measures, including returning to service of all circuits, connecting 
all LPTs to distribute the GIC, increasing voltage support and calling back extra staff. Early 
warning, if heeded, can mitigate the threat of GICs and reduce the potential of 
damage. Before and during the 2003 Halloween geomagnetic storm, power companies in 
the United States received the standard watches, warnings and alerts, and responded by 
reducing system load, disconnecting system components and postponing system 
maintenance (MacAlester & Murtagh, 2014). Damage to the US power grid was limited 
compared to Sweden and South Africa (NOAA, 2004; OECD, 2011; Gaunt & Coetzee, 
2007). However, it is difficult to determine the impact of protective measures, because the 
damage from space weather events is a function of several parameters, including the local 
intensity of the geomagnetic storm, ground conductivity and network topology. 
4.3 Floods 
Floods are commonly associated with power outages. Electricity was interrupted in 
100% of the flood events reviewed in this study. As in the aftermath of earthquakes, 
power is restored progressively. In our sample, the blackout lasted from less than 24 
hours to more than one month. Except in extreme cases, it took one week or less to 
restore power to all customers who could receive it. The longest blackouts were caused 
during floods associated with hurricanes. However, in these cases it was unclear what 
fraction of the damage was caused by floodwaters versus that generated by high winds. 
For instance, Figure 6 illustrates the total number of power outages restored in the days 
following the landfall of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for Entergy, an integrated power 
provider servicing 2.7 million customers in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 
The term “Return to Service Customers” is used here for customers who can take power. 
The following sections describe the impact of equipment damage and early warning on 
post-flood electricity recovery. 
4.3.1 Equipment damage 
Because water is a very good conductor of electricity, some electrical equipment items 
can suffer catastrophic failures in the presence of even minute quantities of 
moisture and dirt. For example, when Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New York, a 
submerged transformer located in a substation near the bank of the East River exploded, 
leaving much of Lower Manhattan in the dark. The explosion was visible from across the 
river (Huffington Post, 2012; Walsh, 2012). Large amounts of water and mud may be 
trapped in several types of substation equipment items following submersion. Inundated 
circuit breakers, transformer parts, control house equipment, and metallic switchgear need 
to be disassembled and cleaned before they can be put back into service. The level of 
damage and the required repairs increase with the time the equipment in 
submerged for. Some equipment items may even be unsalvageable. Given the delicate 
nature of the repairs, the task workload increases rapidly as more items are submerged. 
The restoration efforts following the Missouri floods in 1993 illustrate the order of 
magnitude of the time needed to make repairs (Abi-Samra & Henry, 2011). Restoring a 
single control house took hundreds of work hours, because of the countless devices and 
wiring terminations which had to be cleaned. Circuit breakers were repaired if the cost of 
the intervention was less than half of a new piece of equipment. Positive-pressure systems, 





Figure 6. Restoration of power in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (in thousands) 
 
Source: Entergy Corporation, 2005 
Buried equipment is more expensive and more vulnerable. Burying electrical equipment, 
such as distribution substations and power lines, is often considered in urban areas, as a 
measure to reduce building density, improve security, and protect against weather-related 
hazards, such as storms and floods. However, this solution has been proven to be 
expensive and time-consuming. For instance, the State of North Carolina in the United 
States considered replacing all existing overhead distribution lines with underground cables 
after a major ice storm in December 2002. However, it was estimated that the project 
would cost US$ 41 million, nearly six times the net books value of the distribution assets 
of all State DSOs, and would require 25 years to complete (North Carolina Public Staff 
Utilities Commission, 2003). In addition, buried equipment is more difficult to access for 
maintenance and repairs and, more importantly, are more vulnerable to floods and other 
weather-related hazards. For example, underground assets have been washed away during 
hurricanes and are reportedly prone to frequent flooding (Abi-Samra, 2013). 
Because of their ubiquity and high concentration of sensitive equipment, substations are 
at increased risk from floods. It is generally accepted that the restoration of a flooded 
substation takes much longer than the repair of a downed power line damaged 
by ice or wind (Ab-Samra, 2010). As more equipment items are inundated, the time 
needed to conduct repairs with a limited workforce becomes a major determinant of the 
power grid recovery time. Table 5 outlines the damage and service disruption scale 
developed for the impact of floods on substation equipment. 
Flood mitigation strategies were effective in reducing the damage to critical substation 
equipment, and therefore cutting down recovery time, in this study. Examples of 
successful strategies include locating the substation above flood levels, levee 
protection and elevating sensitive equipment. For example, the Tennyson Substation 
in Queensland, Australia, was built well above inundation levels and suffered no 
interruption during the 2010 flood. In another substation, flood waters reached about 1m 
in the switchyard and 40 cm in the control house, but did not pose a threat to equipment. 
In that case, power was only interrupted for 3 hours for the TSO to reroute the electricity 
supply safely through the substation (Powerlink Queensland, 2011). 
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Table 5. Substation equipment flood damage and failure modes 
Damage or service 
disruption 
Description 
Slight/Minor Shut off preemptively 
Tripping 
Moderate Inundated, repairs economically feasible 
Severe Inundated, beyond economically feasible repair 
Catastrophic Explosion 
Washed away by floodwaters 
 
Floodwater-caused structural damage to technological systems typically results from a 
combination of buoyancy, hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads, as well as debris impact 
(Krausmann et al., 2011). In this study, however, there was no indication of structural 
damage to substation equipment contributing to recovery time. The mechanical properties 
of these items may offer one potential explanation. Substation equipment has a relatively 
high weight-to-volume ratio, which helps to resist buoyancy forces, and a relatively slim 
profile, which affords less exposure to hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. 
Although structural damage was not a concern for substation equipment, floodwaters 
were a threat to transmission towers in this study. Landslides and soil erosion caused 
by the flood or rainfall may severely undermine the foundations of transmission towers. 
For example, during the 2011 floods in Australia, one transmission tower collapsed because 
of a landslide. Although there was no interruption of high-voltage supply, a replacement, 
H-frame concrete tower had to be erected, and the endeavor took 2 weeks. During the 
same floods, 30 m of river bank was eroded back to the base of another tower, forcing the 
TSO to take the two circuits mounted on this tower offline until a replacement tower could 
be built on safe soil (Powerlink Queensland, 2011). 
4.3.2 Early warning and emergency response 
Early warning was a major determinant of power grid resilience, as it gave TSOs and DSOs 
in the affected area time to activate their emergency response and business continuity 
arrangements. Preemptively interrupting power supply, and pre-staging repair 
crews, equipment and supplies proved highly successful in this study. 
One of the most effective strategies implemented by power companies when a flood is 
imminent is preemptively shutting down power to vulnerable substations located in the 
flood zone. This prevents catastrophic damage incurred when water comes in contact with 
live equipment. The unavoidable disadvantage is that outages may extend to areas 
otherwise unaffected by the flood. For example, a neighborhood may suffer a power 
disruption if it is serviced by a substation at risk of being inundated. Even if that area ends 
up in the flood zone, it is likely that the outage may start long before the flood. In at least 
4 cases in this study, the outages were at least partially due to preemptive interruptions. 
Despite the inconvenience, this strategy ultimately reduces recovery time, because the 
most severe damage is avoided. 
Early warning also provides TSOs and DSOs time to activate their emergency response 
systems. An effective strategy is to activate surge mechanisms before the onset of the 
flood and staging repair capabilities at the edge of the flood zone. When a damage from a 
flood is expected to overwhelm the capabilities of a single TSO/DSO, the affected operator 
requests assistance from neighboring TSOs/DSOs. Help typically includes repair crews, 
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equipment and supplies. For instance, the effective response of power companies is largely 
credited for the fast restoration of power in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Widespread power outages, caused by the combined impact of flood and wind, had left 
more than 2 million customers without power in at least seven States. Power companies 
in the affected areas activated their emergency plans prior to landfall, and brought in repair 
crews from 23 States and Canada. Entergy, an integrated energy provider, mobilized more 
than 30,000 workers to restore power, including its own staff, workers recruited before the 
storm, and crews provided by neighboring power companies (Entergy, 2005). 
Although the rapid surge of repair capabilities was instrumental in expediting recovery after 
Katrina and Rita, it also sent logistics needs through the roof. In the emergency 
management field, not or poorly addressing response-generated demands has often been 
cited as a cause of disaster response failures (Karagiannis, 2005; Karagiannis & Synolakis, 
2017). The response of the electricity sector to Katrina and Rita was an exception to that 
trend. For example, all of the customers of Mississippi Power lost electricity during 
Hurricane Katrina. This integrated provider promptly activated its disaster response plan 
and pre-positioned repair crews at the edge of the hurricane zone. During the peak of the 
response, the company provided shelter to approximately 11,000 personnel, served up to 
32,500 meals per day, commissioned 65 buses, and operated 18 shelter and 12 logistics 
sites. By rapidly deploying surge capabilities and addressing response-generated demands, 
Mississippi Power was able to restore power to every customer who could receive it in as 
little as 12 days (Ball, 2006). 
Although disaster preparedness was an important determinant of restoration 
throughout this study, it played a critical role in flood response. The discussion of 
the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlights that pre-disaster planning is needed 
for the provision of early warning, the deployment of surge capabilities, and addressing 
disaster-generated demands. In addition, preparedness integrates the response 
efforts of system operators (TSOs and DSOs) with those of the wider emergency 
management community. The resulting agility and unity of effort is a well-known 
contributor to operational effectiveness. Two examples help to illustrate this. First, several 
oil refineries lost power when Katrina battered the Southeastern United States. Because 
these facilities were considered vital to the national economy, restoration of power became 
a priority, and the recovery effort had to be coordinated between the power utility, the 
refineries and the US Department of Homeland Security (Entergy, 2005). Second, 
coordination between the emergency management community and the electricity sector 
helped expedite the power grid recovery after the 2011 Queensland, Australia floods. 
Because Powerlink, Queensland’s TSO, sat in the State Disaster Coordination Committee, 
it had access not only to daily briefings with the Queensland Bureau of Meteorology, but 
also to aerial resources made available by the Australian Defense Force and flood boats 
from the State Emergency Service and the Water Police (Powerlink Queensland, 2011). 
Irrespective of the effectiveness of emergency plans, many types of repairs cannot 
start until the waters recede. The duration of the inundation was a major determinant 
of the power grid recovery time consistently in this study. Repairing substation equipment 
is meaningless if the substation is inundated. Attempts to repair downed transmission lines 
in inundated areas means putting workers at risk of electrocution and entanglement. In 
addition, any operations in moving waters are considered high-risk endeavors, and are 
generally justified only for rescue and evacuation purposes by trained personnel. 
4.4 Comparison of damage types 
Each of the three natural hazards reviewed in this study causes different types of damage, 
as they stress power grids in different ways. Earthquake damage is caused by strong 
ground motion, which exerts inertial loads on buildings and may result in ground failure. 
Space weather generates GICs which may damage AC equipment not designed to handle 
DCs. Floods damage occurs as floodwaters seep in inundated equipment and soils. Because 
each hazard generates a different type of stress, it results in different types of damage and 
affects another set of power grid components (Table 6). 
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For instance, both earthquakes and floods have the potential for causing foundation 
damage, albeit through different mechanisms. Earthquake strong ground motion results in 
ground failure, which may threaten the foundations of buildings and transmission towers. 
Floods cause landslides by increasing pore water pressure within the soil, therefore 
reducing shear strength. Floodwaters may also cause excessive erosion and undermine 
foundations. In this study, there was no indication of flood-induced damage to substation 
building, but there were cases of foundation damage to transmission towers. 
Moreover, both earthquakes and floods cause widespread damage to electrical equipment 
and power grid components. The damaged items need to be either repaired or replaced, 
and the time to conduct repairs or install new equipment drives the recovery of the power 
grid. In the case of earthquakes and floods, it was the number of items which drove 
recovery time in this study. In addition, access to the damaged sites was a major 
determinant of recovery time in the aftermath of both earthquakes and floods. In 
some cases, access to substations or transmission towers was blocked by landslides 
(triggered by strong ground motion or rainfall). Other factors which were found to affect 
recovery time in this study were the extent of the damage, the complexity of required 
repairs, the availability of spares (either with the affected utility, through mutual aid 
agreements, or from the manufacturer), and transportation arrangements. 
Earthquakes and floods cause widespread destruction of electrical equipment, and recovery 
time is driven by the duration of repairs and access to damaged equipment and facilities. 
In contrast to earthquakes and floods, which affect individual components of the 
power grid, space weather events may affect the entire grid at the same time. 
Damage to far less equipment by GICs can cause disproportionately greater damage to the 
power grid. First, GICs have a higher potential for catastrophic damage compared to 
earthquakes and floods. In this study, GICs were associated with a higher comparative 
frequency of catastrophic damage compared to earthquakes and floods. Second, the effects 
of space weather events are insidious and attack the power grid from within. GICs may 
cause the entire grid to collapse when multiple nodes go offline. Although there has been 
only one instance of network-wide collapse (the 1989 Quebec storm), it clearly 
demonstrates the potential for system-wide impact of GICs. Additionally, this study did not 
find instances of system-wide collapse cause by earthquakes or floods. 
Irrespective of the cause, system-wide damage can be exacerbated if the 
disturbance is allowed to propagate through multiple transmission lines. 
Interconnections generally improve resilience against damage to individual components 
(cf. Section 5.1). Damage to critical nodes, such as substations, may be mitigated by 
rerouting power through other circuits, while the loss of generating facilities may be 
moderated if the remaining assets are able to cover the demand. Because earthquakes 
and floods affect only individual components, such as substations, generating assets and 
transmission lines, network theory suggests that interconnections increase the power grid’s 
resilience. However, interconnections may also increase the grid’s vulnerability, if they 
allow a disturbance to propagate and affect multiple components. Because quasi-DCs have 
the potential to cause system-wide damage, high network betweenness centrality may 
increase the vulnerability of an electric power network to GICs resulting from space 
weather storms. 
Although the recovery timeframe may vary among different hazards, as illustrated in Table 
6, recovery is always progressive. Figure 6 illustrates power grid recovery, quantified in 
terms of the number of power outage restorations in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. Figure 7 illustrates the recovery of the power grid versus time in the aftermath 
of the September 1999, Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake and Hurricane Sandy. In all 4 cases, 
the recovery timeline is consistent with the concept of engineering resilience advanced by 
recent publications and guidance documents (Ganin et al., 2016). Although the shape of 




Table 6. Overview of damage types and natural hazard impacts on the power grid 
 Earthquake Space weather Flood 
Damage types Structural damage due to inertial 
loading 
Foundation/ground failure 
Damage to transmission and 
generation equipment from GICs 
Potential for system-wide impact 
Damage to transmission tower 
foundations due to erosion and/or 
landslides 




No warning time 




Heavy equipment (e.g. generators, 
LPTs) 
Ceramic parts (e.g. bushings, bus 
bars) or equipment (e.g. 
transformers) 
Equipment vulnerable to direct 
current (e.g. transformers) 





time is driven 
by 
Number of items in need of repair or 
replacement 
Access to conduct repairs 
System-wide impact 
Delayed effects 
Floodwaters recession (access) 




A few hours to months; most 
commonly, 1 to 4 days 
Power to areas serviced by equipment 
which has only tripped offline restored 
within less than 24 hours after the 
end of the storm 
Repairs of damaged equipment may 
take several months 
Less than 24 hours to 3 weeks 
Longer recovery times (up to 5 
weeks) with hurricane and/or storm 
damage 
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Figure 7. Left: Power supplied by Taipower in the aftermath of the September 1999, Chi-Chi, 
Taiwan earthquake, as a percentage of the power supplied before the earthquake). Right: Number 
of power outages reported after Hurricane Sandy landfall. 
 
Source: Schiff & Tang, 2000; Manzfield & Linzey, 2013. 
In addition, the recovery process may itself be disrupted and suffer setbacks. The power 
outage restorations in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, were interrupted 
by the landfall of Hurricane Rita, which caused nearly 80% as many outages as Hurricane 
Katrina, and set back the recovery process by 23 days. In the case of solar storms, delayed 
effects of GICs, such as the transformer damage discussed in section 4.2, may also delay 


































5 Other factors affecting recovery time 
The previous chapter discussed the impact of the damage caused by natural hazards on 
power grid recovery time based on physical damage. However, recovery time is also a 
function of the resilience of the critical electricity infrastructure subsector. This chapter 
describes the effect of natural hazards on the emergency response and recovery 
capabilities of electric utility operators and disaster-affected communities. Section 5.1 
focuses on the resilience of electric power utilities. Section 5.2 describes how the disruption 
of other critical infrastructure may affect community resilience in terms of the power grid 
recovery time. Last, section 5.3 discusses how the impact of cascading disruptions of 
critical infrastructure, stemming from power outages, may feedback in the power grid 
recovery time. 
5.1 Resilience of electric power utilities 
Chapter 4 illustrated the impact of the level of damage on recovery time. Although different 
natural hazards affect electric utilities in a different way, as the intensity of the hazard 
increases, the level of damage increases as well. As damage accumulates, more complex, 
time-consuming and costly repairs need to be conducted to restore power supply to 
customers and repair critical equipment and facilities. Therefore, recovery time is 
prolonged. However, for a given damage level, recovery time depends on the capability of 
the affected electric utility companies and TSOs to respond promptly and effectively. 
Emergency response capabilities encompass trained staff, adequate resources, and an 
appropriate organization. 
Emergency diesel generators are typically used to quickly restore electricity supply to 
customers until repairs are conducted. In this study, this course of action has been effective 
in the aftermath of earthquakes or floods, when distribution cables have been severed or 
generation capacity is reduced. Emergency diesel generators can be procured by 
commercial suppliers or through mutual aid agreements, but their specifications need to 
be appropriate for the part of the grid they are connected to. Emergency planning can 
speed the response by identifying capability requirements and suppliers before disaster 
strikes. However, response-generated demands are notoriously underestimated by 
emergency operations plans (McEntire, 2007) and during incident planning (Karagiannis & 
Synolakis, 2017). Once an appropriate generator is located, logistics becomes the 
single most important determinant of electricity supply restoration time in the 
affected area. Medium-sized generators may be airlifted, but require large transport 
aircraft which may only be available to the military of a few countries. In addition to their 
limited availability, these aircraft come with constraints on runway bearing capacity and 
length. Larger generators may only be transported by ship. Furthermore, road 
transportation of heavy equipment, such as high-capacity generators and large power 
transformers, is likely to be challenging. Special trailers may have to be used and traffic 
may have to be redirected for a large truck to pass. The load bearing capacity of the road 
may have to be assessed before heavy equipment can be safely moved. It is not uncommon 
for several weeks to pass before heavy equipment arrives and can be put into service in 
the disaster-affected area. 
The transportation of heavy equipment, such as emergency diesel generators, is further 
complicated by the operational friction that results from the overwhelming and often 
conflicting demands posed by disasters. In the aftermath of a natural disaster, the need to 
transport high-capacity generators is measured against the need to deploy search and 
rescue teams, emergency medical care resources and food to assist the affected 
population. In terms of disaster response logistics, a high-capacity generator rapidly takes 
up half the capacity of a large commercial transport aircraft. The choice is exceptionally 
difficult to make, especially in the early phases of disaster response, when emergency care 
and search and rescue are of paramount importance. 
The destruction of the Vasilikos Power Plant in Cyprus in July 2011 points to the logistics 
challenges of using emergency diesel generators. Although the power plant was not 
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destroyed by a natural hazard, but by an explosion of confiscated ammunition stored in 
the nearby Evangelos Florakis Naval Base, the effort to restore power supply shares many 
of the characteristics of natural disaster responses. The timeline of the operation (Figure 
8) provides insight into the importance of logistics and preparedness of what has been 
identified as one of the largest operations – both in terms of value and size – ever 
conducted through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism by a single country (DG ECHO, 
2012). The Vasilikos Power Plant contributed 50% of Cyprus’ production capacity, and its 
destruction resulted in power outages all over the island. Cyprus requested international 
assistance, including through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. It took more than 90 days 
for generators of a total capacity of 165 MW to ship to Cyprus from various locations and 
get connected to the grid. Among others, generators of a total capacity of 70 MW were 
shipped from Greece, and this operation was co-funded by the Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument of the European Commission. Repairs to the power plant were completed 25 
months after the explosion and cost more than €43 million (EAC, 2013). In the meantime, 
the Cypriot government advised customers to limit power usage, and resorted to buying 
power from external sources. In addition to being a realistic demonstration of the dynamics 
of long-term power outage, this operation also highlights the role of the European solidarity 
and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in critical infrastructure resilience. 
Figure 8. Power grid recovery timeline following the 2011 explosion at the Evangelos Florakis 
Naval Base, Cyprus 
 
Source: Adapted from DG ECHO (2012), Kathimerini (2011), Naftemporiki (2011), EAC (2011, 2012, 2013) 
In addition to production capabilities, the availability of spares used to replace 
damaged equipment or parts can reduce recovery time. For instance, when the 
Kocaeli, Turkey earthquake of August 17, 1999 happened, the transmission system was 
undergoing a major expansion. Therefore, new equipment and materials were readily 
available, and helped speed up the recovery process. The availability of spares depends 
almost entirely on cost versus benefit. Electric power utilities, TSOs and DSOs often 
maintain stocks of small size and relatively inexpensive equipment for maintenance and 
emergencies. The availability of these spares helps expedite the repair of distribution lines, 
and transmission and distribution substations. However, spare LPTs are difficult to 
maintain, because of their high cost and specificity. In some cases, parts may be salvaged 
by out-of-service equipment to conduct repairs, but this may not always be possible. 
In addition to preplanning, political support can also go a long way in enhancing the 
restoration and repair capabilities of electric utilities. For example, after the Lushan, China 
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earthquake of April 20, 2013, the Chinese Prime Minister issued an executive order 
prioritizing the need for functioning lifelines. As a result, the repair of transmission 
substations damaged by the earthquake was expedited. The Lushan 110 kV substation was 
among the most severely damaged, including the loss of 40% of the equipment in the 110 
kV switchyard. A crew of 110 technicians repaired the switchyard in a record time of 3 days 
and restored a 110 kV transformer 28 days after the earthquake (Eidinger, Tang & Davis, 
2014). 
In addition to restoration capabilities, network interconnections also increase 
resilience, not by speeding repairs, but by providing alternative power supply 
routes. These often make it possible to reroute power from other sources quite quickly 
and minimize the duration of power outages while repairs are being conducted. For 
instance, after the Kocaeli, Turkey earthquake of August 17, 1999, power received from 
Bulgaria, Georgia and Iran was used to restart power plants outside the affected area 
(EPRI, 2001). In the aftermath of the 1989 Quebec blackout, caused by GICs from a 
geomagnetic storm, power rerouted from New Brunswick, Ontario, New York and New 
England was used to temporarily restore power supply to customers while repairs were 
underway (OECD, 2011). By the same token, independent power producers also increase 
the resilience of electric utilities by providing alternatives for temporary restoration of 
power supply to either domestic users or critical customers, such as hospitals and 
industry). For example, 5 days after the Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake of September 21, 
1999, power from an independent producer was used to restore electricity supply to the 
high-tech facilities at the Hsinchu Science Park, the disruption of which was already 
affecting the global computer industry (Schiff & Tang, 2000). Nonetheless, 
interconnections may also contribute to damage from GICs, as discussed in section 4.4. 
Last, network configuration may also increase the resilience of electric utilities. 
Grid configurations allow the network to be modified in case of failure of one or more nodes 
and arcs, by opening and closing switches. Switches may be controlled automatically, 
manually, or remotely from a control room using SCADA systems. Subtransmission and 
distribution circuits are usually arranged in non-radial grid configurations. Therefore, even 
catastrophic damage to individual facilities or components may result in shorter outages 
because utility operators are able to divert power through other parts of the network. For 
example, when the small distribution substation at Sumner Redcliffs was destroyed by a 
rockfall triggered by the February 22, 2011, earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, the 
disruption was minimal, because the DSO was able to bypass the substation using the 
existing network (Tang, 2016). On the other hand, radial networks have less 
redundancy. For instance, four transmission lines were used by Taipower (Taiwan Power 
Company) to carry power from the south and central parts of the island to the north, where 
demand exceeds generation supply. The loss of a single transmission tower, which carried 
two of these circuits during the Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake of September 21, 1999, 
severely compromised Taipower’s capability to carry power to the north of the island, and 
contributed to a long-term blackout (Schiff & Tang, 2000). 
5.2 Disruption of other critical infrastructure 
The previous section presented the impact of repair and restoration capabilities, and 
network topology on the resilience of electric utility companies. This section is a discussion 
of “second-order” effects of natural hazards on the power grid recovery time. In other 
words, it explores how the disruption of other critical infrastructure, caused by natural 
hazards, may affect the repair and restoration of the electricity supply. Of all critical 
infrastructure, the disruption of transportation and telecommunications posed the 
most significant threat to the recovery of power systems in this study. Table 7 
outlines the damage from earthquakes, space weather and floods. 
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Table 7. Impact of earthquakes, space weather events and floods on critical infrastructure sectors other than the power grid 
 Earthquake Space weather Flood 
Transportation Structural damage to ports, airports, 
bridges, roads and railroad tracks. 
Debris may block road and rail 
transportation. 
Tsunamis may damage port 
infrastructure. 
GNSS unavailability and/or 
positioning errors (navigation). 
Radiation risk to avionics. 
Minor disruption to road and railway 
transportation. 
Flooding of roads and railway tracks. 
Obstruction of roads due to debris 
left by floods. 
Traffic congestion associated with 
evacuation may delay preventive 
shut down. 
Communications Structural damage to cell towers and 
two-way radio repeaters. 
Cell phone network congestion. 
HF radio communications blackout. 
Satellite communications affected. 
Cellular network base stations and 
two-way radio repeaters could 
experience increased static at dawn 
and dusk. 
Inundation of telecommunications 











The following sections describe how the power grid recovery time is affected by the 
disruption of transportation and communications caused by earthquakes, space weather 
and floods. 
5.2.1 Earthquakes 
Earthquakes wreak havoc on air, sea and land transportation infrastructure. Ground failure 
and structural damage are the most common causes of disruption. Airport runways may 
be severely damaged from ground failure, while operations may be severely compromised 
due to structural damage to the control tower, terminals and other buildings. Aircraft 
refueling may be impossible if fuel tanks and pipelines, which are often located inside 
airports, suffer damage from inertial forces or soil liquefaction. Liquefaction of loose, 
saturated and sandy soils and fills is the primary cause of damage to ports. It results in 
excessive deformation of dikes, retaining structures and pavements, failure of pile supports 
and damage to port buildings (Schiff & Buckle, 1995). 
Damage to ports and airports can hinder the transportation of critical equipment 
or parts, and can cause significant delays to the recovery process. In addition, the 
disruption of sea and/or air transportation can delay the delivery of key resources, 
such as fuel for emergency diesel generators, thus further exacerbating power 
outages. Islands are particularly vulnerable to port and airport transportation disruptions. 
For instance, when the Vasilikos Poser Plant in Cyprus was destroyed in 2011, the country’s 
ports and airports were not affected. All emergency diesel generators used to temporarily 
restore power supply to the affected area were brought in by boat. Therefore, the 
restoration and recovery process would have certainly taken significantly longer if sea 
and/or air transportation had been compromised. 
In addition to ports and airports, road and railroad transportation networks are also 
susceptible to earthquake damage. Road and railroad bridges are the most vulnerable part 
of these networks. The most common failure mechanism is damage to the substructure 
and foundations. The unavailability of bridges may delay restoration and repairs, 
as personnel and equipment need to find alternative routes to reach the affected 
areas. Road pavements are principally affected by ground failure, such as liquefaction. 
Damaged pavements may become unpassable by trucks and trailers, which usually carry 
much needed heavy equipment, such as generators and replacement transformers. The 
need to find alternative routes will prolong the recovery process. Another common reason 
of road closure is landslides, especially in mountainous regions. Transmission towers are 
often in mountainous areas, and may only be accessible by narrow, winding, unpaved 
roads. Roads need to be cleared of debris before repair crews can access the site to assess 
the damage. After the Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake of September 21, 1999, the 
replacement of the collapsed transmission tower which had been supporting two of the 
four lines carrying much needed power to the north of the island was delayed for 3 days 
until the access roads were cleared. Only after access was re-established could 
replacement parts be brought to the site. 
Furthermore, traffic congestion is not uncommon in the immediate aftermath of major 
earthquakes. Traffic jams are caused in urban areas, as people attempt to self-evacuate 
for fear of aftershocks. Unfavorable traffic conditions are likely to delay the movement of 
repair and maintenance crews, and hinder the recovery process in the early hours of the 
response. Nevertheless, traffic congestion usually subsides within a few hours of the 
earthquake. 
Other than because of the disruption of the transportation infrastructure, the recovery of 
the power grid after an earthquake may be hindered by the failure of 
telecommunications systems. Electric utility companies rely on two-way radios 
and/or cellular telephones to coordinate repair and maintenance crews in daily 
and emergency operations. Both telecommunications systems were damaged by 
earthquakes reviewed in this study. In several cases, seismic forces caused structural 
damage to two-way radio repeaters and mobile network cell towers. Without a working 
repeater, two-way radios can only support line-of-sight communications, which are 
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practically useless in urban areas. When a cell site is damaged, mobile phone service in 
the cell is lost until another antenna takes over or the damaged antenna is fixed. In 
addition, cell phone networks were often congested in the immediate aftermath of 
earthquakes, as people sought to communicate with family members and loved ones in the 
affected area. Cell phone congestion usually subsided within a few hours or days after the 
earthquake. However, without working communications, electric utility companies had a 
hard time coordinating repair and maintenance crews, which arguably slowed down the 
recovery process. 
5.2.2 Space weather events 
Space weather events may affect transportation systems, but in a different way than 
earthquakes. First, solar flares26 may disrupt Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), 
such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and Galileo. These systems may experience 
outages of navigation signals on the sunlit side of the Earth, causing loss of satellite 
positioning capabilities. In addition, there may be increased errors in positioning, which 
tend to be concentrated to the sunlit side of the Earth, but may extend into the dark side 
as well in extreme cases. Avionics can be affected and HF radio communications 
compromised. Solar radiation storms27 may seriously damage satellites, cause a complete 
HF blackout through the polar regions, and expose passengers of airliners flying over high 
latitudes to radiation risk. The reduced availability and reliability of satellite navigation and 
HF radio blackout affect air and maritime navigation, causing routes near the poles to be 
diverted (Krausmann et al., 2015). This may result in a moderate delay of the delivery of 
equipment and supplies to the affected areas and prolong the recovery process. 
The disruption of GNSS may also cause cascading failures in the future28. Present-
day electric power networks use, among others, synchronized measurements from devices 
called Phasor Measurement Units29 (PMUs) to monitor the state of the system (Phadke, 
1993; Shepard, Humphreys & Fansler, 2012). This technique may become a key 
component of future smart grids. However, synchronized phasor measurements rely on 
accurate timing. To this end, PMUs are usually synchronized to the common time source 
of a GPS clock, while atomic clocks provide redundancy. It has been demonstrated that 
the disruption of the GPS signal can distort the measurements made by PMUs and project 
an erroneous picture to system controllers. If these measurements will be used as the main 
input for system control in the future, then the offset signal would trip the components of 
the grid which would erroneously appear as out of phase. Because GPS timing is gaining 
popularity as a timing source for synchronized phasor measurements it argued that, if it 
came to be used as the exclusive timing source, then power grids would become highly 
vulnerable to space-weather-induced disruption of the GPS signal (Krausmann et al., 
2013). 
                                          
(26) Solar flares are large eruptions of electromagnetic radiation from the Sun. They travel at the speed of light, 
and last from minutes to hours. The increased level of radiation disturbs the lower levels of the ionosphere 
on the sunlit side of the Earth. As a result, High Frequency (HF) radio waves, which are normally refracted 
in the upper layers of the ionosphere, can become degraded or completely absorbed. This causes a HF radio 
blackout. GNSS receivers can also be impacted. 
(27) Solar radiation storms include particles (mostly fast-moving protons). They are caused by solar magnetic 
eruptions and are often associated to coronal mass ejections and solar flares. Accelerated protons can reach 
the Earth in just 30 minutes. They penetrate the magnetosphere and travel on the magnetic field lines until 
they penetrate the Earth’s atmosphere near the poles. These energetic protons present a radiation hazard, 
and can cause damage to electronics and biological DNA. They can also create a HF radio blackout by ionizing 
the lower level of the ionosphere. 
(28) Synchronization is the process of ensuring that the frequency of the current flowing through a network is the 
same across the entire grid. Synchronization is of paramount importance to the operation of AC networks. 
An AC generator can only provide power to an electrical grid if both are running on the same frequency. If 
two parts of the grid are disconnected, they can only exchange power after they have been re-synchronized 
in case of an AC interconnection between them. Currently in Europe there are 5 different synchronous areas, 
all of which operate at 50Hz. 
(29) A phasor or phase vector is a basic construct in AC circuit analysis. In mathematical terms, it is a complex 
number representing a sinusoidal function with constant amplitude, angular frequency and initial phase. It 
allows to analyze AC circuits by transforming all electric current waveforms in vectors, which are easier to 
manipulate in calculations. 
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Road and rail transportation may also be disrupted during space weather events. Power 
transformers mounted on electric trains can be damaged by quasi-DC currents in the same 
way as transmission line transformers. Signaling may also be affected. For instance, during 
a geomagnetic storm that hit the Earth on July 13-14, 1982, railway traffic lights in Sweden 
turned erroneously to red (Wik et al., 2009). However, the disruption of road and railway 
signals due to space weather will only cause a minor concern to power grid recovery efforts. 
In addition to transportation, the disruption of telecommunications systems may slow down 
the recovery process. Solar flares and solar radiation storms can cause an HF radio 
blackout, but electric utilities do not use them for neither everyday nor emergency 
communications. On the other hand, there may be a minor disturbance to two-way radio 
and cellular systems. Specifically, cellular network base stations and radio repeaters 
(including two-way radio and TETRA, used by most electric utilities) could experience 
increased noise at dawn and dusk for the parts of the network facing the sun. Nonetheless, 
it is unlikely that space weather events will cause a blackout of these systems, and the 
disruption is expected to be minor. 
5.2.3 Floods 
Floods affect transportation and telecommunications systems alike. Access to inundated 
facilities was a major determinant of the power grid recovery time in this study. 
As discussed in section 4.3, substation repairs can only be conducted once the water has 
receded and the substation is on dry land. In addition, floodwaters may block access to 
electrical utility assets and facilities, and further delay the repair and restoration. 
Inundated roads and railway tracks, and impassable bridges are among the most typical 
consequences of floods. In the aftermath of a major flood, access to substations, 
transmission towers and other facilities may be possible only by boat, which makes 
bringing in heavy or sensitive equipment impossible. Furthermore, the hydrology of 
inundated areas is unknown, and is notorious for presenting many hazards even to flood 
rescue operations (Ray, 2013). Therefore, boat operations supporting power grid repairs 
may have to be gauged against the risk to boat operators and repair crews from water 
travel alone. In this case, power grid repairs may have to be delayed until flood waters 
have receded and the damaged facilities or assets become accessible by road. 
Floods, like earthquakes, may also be associated with traffic congestion. The difference is 
in the timing of the excess traffic with respect to the occurrence of the hazard. Traffic jams 
usually occur in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake and subside shortly after, as 
discussed in section 5.2.1. On the other hand, traffic jams are a typical phenomenon before 
the onset of a flood, especially in areas which are evacuated. For instance, traffic 
congestion during Hurricane Isaac in 2012 delayed the delivery of emergency portable 
generators and the restoration of the power grid (Miles et. al, 2016). 
In addition to transportation, floods may also affect telecommunications. First, 
telecommunications systems facilities and assets may be inundated. Telecommunications 
electronics are potentially even more sensitive to the intrusion of moisture and dirt than 
electric utility equipment. For example, during the monsoon-driven floods of South Indian 
of November and December 2015, telecommunications companies in Chennai, the capital 
of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, reported that network services were disrupted because 
backup generators of critical sites were inundated and failed to operate (Narasimhan & 
Babu, 2016). In addition, strong winds associated with storms and hurricanes may knock 
down cell site towers while the rainfall is causing the water level to rise. 
5.3 Cascading effects 
The previous section outlined the impact of earthquakes, floods and space weather on 
critical infrastructure other than the electricity subsector, and how these disruptions 
undermine the power grid recovery. This section explores another aspect of the 
interdependencies among critical infrastructure. Electric power is the utility on which 
most other critical infrastructure sectors rely for daily operations. Therefore, a 
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prolonged power outage is likely to adversely affect many critical infrastructure sectors 
which lack redundant systems, such as backup generators. However, some of these 
sectors may be supporting emergency repairs and the power grid restoration 
effort. This produces a vicious circle, in which the disruption of the power grid caused by 
a natural hazard adversely affects other critical infrastructure sectors, the disruption of 
which undermines the recovery of the power grid. What follows is a discussion of how 
power outages cascade into other critical infrastructure sectors, and how the disruption of 
the latter prolongs the recovery of the power grid. Specifically, two sectors have been 
identified in this study are telecommunications and emergency services. 
5.3.1 Telecommunications 
As noted in section 5.2.1, electric utilities use two-way radios and cellular telephones for 
daily and emergency telecommunication with repair crews. Two-way radios need repeaters 
to operate beyond line-of-sight and cellular networks rely on transceivers mounted on cell 
towers. Both facilities need electricity to work, and are connected to the electricity grid. To 
mitigate against power outages, both types of facilities are equipped with backup batteries 
or generators. However, batteries can only keep the network running for a limited amount 
of time. When the batteries run out, communications with the areas serviced by that cell 
tower is lost, and two-way radios are only effective within line-of-sight distances. The 
duration of the battery supply differs from one country to another. For example, cell sites 
in Japan have 30 hours of reserve battery power, and some ran out in after the Niigataken-
Chuetsu-Oki earthquake of July 16, 2017. On the other hand, 1,500 cellular base stations 
went out of service due to power failure 3 hours after the Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake of 
September 21, 1999. Cell sites in the United States also have 3 hours of battery power 
(Schiff & Tang, 2000; Tang & Schiff, 2007). 
In addition, generators require a steady supply of fuel to keep working. For instance, many 
cell sites in the Lushan Province, China ran on power generators up to 20 days after the 
Lushan earthquake of April 20, 2013. About 80 generators had to be brought in (some 
using military air transportation) to maintain or restore telecommunications coverage in 
the affected area in the aftermath of the Christchurch, New Zealand earthquake of 
February 22, 2011 (Eidinger et al., 2014; Tang, 2016). However, fuel for backup 
generators may not be available in the aftermath of a natural disaster, or limited resources 
may be prioritized to other activities. 
The insufficiency of reserve power was a recurring problem in this study. There 
were numerous reports of cell sites running out of battery power during prolonged power 
outages, or backup generators failing to start or lacking fuel. The resulting loss of two-
way communications between a power utility and its repair crews has been a 
major determinant of the power grid recovery time. Several utilities reported that 
restoration of power to customers was hindered and/or delayed because of the lack of 
communications between head offices and repair crews. 
5.3.2 Emergency services 
The disruption of telecommunications probably affects emergency services more severely 
than any other critical infrastructure sector. With the transition from the traditional to the 
professional paradigm (McEntire, 2006), the number of responding organizations in any 
given disaster has risen sharply and horizontal relationships between these organizations 
are emphasized. As a consequence, emergency management has become even more 
telecommunications-intensive. Present-day emergency services worldwide use two-way 
radios and cellular telephones intensively during the disaster response phase. When both 
run out of power, fire/rescue, ambulance, police and other agencies fall back to their 
redundant systems. For example, emergency services in Taiwan routinely use cell phones 
for day-to-day tactical communications. When cellular service went down in the aftermath 
of the Chi-Chi earthquake of September 21, 1999, they had to resort to using satellite 
telephones for tactical communications (Schiff & Tang, 2000). In another example, during 
the 2015 Lancaster, UK, flood the resulting power outage took out most modern 
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communications systems in the affected area, leaving residents with nothing but local radio 
stations for receiving disaster-related information. After their studio was inundated, the 
main radio station in the area could only obtain updates through a landline from a reporter 
dispatched to an unaffected location, and broadcast out of an improvised alternative office 
using a backup generator (Ferranti et al, 2017).  
The lack of telecommunications may also affect early warning. Perhaps the most flagrant 
example is the Tonga tsunami of May 4, 2006, when a tsunami warning issued from the 
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) was not received because of a short island-wide 
power blackout (NBC News, 2006). Although PTWC eventually cancelled the warning, the 
consequences of a larger tsunami would have been potentially devastating due to the lack 
of warning. In addition to the potential for widespread human losses, if the earthquake had 
generated a larger tsunami, the early warning could have bought the island’s power utilities 
time to take protective action to mitigate the damage from the tsunami surge, such as 





6 Discussion and recommendations 
Electricity is the one critical infrastructure sector upon which all others depend. A reliable 
supply of electric power is a major underpinning of the economy of the European Union 
and its Member States. This study has outlined the impact to the power grid from 
earthquakes, space weather and floods, and how the recovery time may differ based on 
the type of damage sustained by each hazard. 
We found that different hazards affect the power grid in a different way. Earthquakes cause 
inertial damage to heavy equipment and brittle items, such as ceramics, and ground failure 
and soil liquefaction can be devastating to electric infrastructure assets. Equipment 
anchoring was the most effective mitigation strategy we identified, and site selection can 
arguably reduce the exposure to ground failure. Recovery time is driven by the balance of 
repairs and capabilities. Poor access to damaged facilities, due to landslides or traffic 
congestion, can also delay repairs. In this study, recovery time ranged from a few hours 
to months, but more frequently from 1 to 4 days.  
Erosion and landslides triggered by floods undermine the foundations of transmission 
towers. Serious, and often explosive, damage may occur when electrified equipment comes 
in contact with water, while moisture and dirt intrusion require time-consuming repairs of 
inundated equipment. In contrast to earthquakes, early warning is possible, and enables 
electric utilities to shut off power to facilities in flood zones, therefore minimizing damage. 
The most effective mitigation strategies included elevation, levees and locating critical 
facilities outside the flood zone. Recovery time was driven by the same parameters as in 
the case of earthquakes, namely the sheer number of needed repairs, and access as repairs 
cannot start until floodwaters have receded. In this study, power was back online from 24 
hours up to 3 weeks after the flood. However, longer recovery times (up to 5 weeks) were 
associated with floods spawned by hurricanes and storms. 
Space weather affects transmission and generation equipment through GICs. In contrast 
to earthquakes and floods, GICs have the potential to affect the entire transmission 
network. Although some early warning is possible, warning lead times are typically very 
short and existing forecasting capabilities need to be improved to provide transmission 
system operators all the information they need for preparing for a severe event. Delayed 
effects and the potential for system-wide impact were the main drivers of recovery time in 
this study. When damage is limited to tripping of protective devices, restoration time is 
less than 24 hours. However, repairs of damaged equipment may take up to several 
months. 
The following is a discussion of the findings of this study with a view to producing a set of 
recommendations for policy development, hazard mitigation and emergency management. 
6.1 Policy recommendations 
From a policy perspective, the main challenge is harmonization of the multiple policy areas 
which affect the safety and security of Europe’s electricity supply. Jurisdiction over 
management of the risk to the electric power grid from natural hazards is spread over 
several administrative levels. At each administrative level, electricity supply involves a 
multitude of public and private stakeholders, and authority over risk management is spread 
horizontally over many actors. Policy-level recommendations focus on improving 
harmonization with a view to streamlining power grid resilience efforts. 
At the European Union level, the protection of electricity from natural hazards is addressed 
in energy, civil protection and critical infrastructure policies. Energy-related regulations 
focus on maintaining generation/demand balance. Risk assessments are geared towards 
ensuring security of supply, and address natural hazards only implicitly. Civil protection 
regulations require Member-States to produce comprehensive national risk assessments, 
and several Member-States have included the disruption of the electricity subsector in their 
national risk assessments. However, current disaster risk assessment guidance 
documentation focuses on human and economic losses, and does not specify how critical 
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infrastructure may be included in national risk assessments. Critical infrastructure 
protection policies require System Operators to develop and maintain Operator Security 
Plans addressing the risk of disruption from major threat scenarios. These policies focus 
on critical infrastructure from a resilience perspective, and highlight the interdependencies 
among various critical infrastructure sectors. However, there is no explicit requirement for 
addressing natural hazards, and the current trend is to prioritize man-made threats. 
Each of these existing policies tends to focus on one aspect of the power grid resilience. 
Without a complete picture of the natural hazards facing the electricity grid, energy-related 
regulations may be protecting the power grid against the wrong hazards. Without a proper 
understanding of the capabilities and resilience of the power grid, civil protection plans 
may be calling for the wrong mitigation and response measures. 
In addition, each of these policies establishes another set of regulatory requirements and 
places an additional burden on Member State authorities and System Operators. For 
example, a TSO may need to develop an Operator Security Plan, because it is a critical 
infrastructure, cooperate with the Member-State’s National Civil Protection Authority to 
develop the National Risk Assessment, and (once the proposed Regulation on risk-
preparedness in the electricity sector is approved) work with a Regional Operation Center 
to develop a crisis risk assessment. Besides the added burden, there is a risk of confusion 
stemming from each of these strategic documents addressing another hazard. For 
example, the NRA may be based on the 100-year flood, the crisis risk assessment on the 
50-year flood, while the OSP may not include floods at all. Each document may suggest 
different flood protection measures for the utility’s facilities, and add to the economic 
burden of maintaining a reliable electricity supply. In addition, the emergency plans 
produced based on each strategic document, may be built on a different set of assumptions 
and dictate a different set of measures. Early disaster research has pointed out the risk for 
confusion stemming from the use of multiple plans to manage a single incident (Auf Der 
Heide, 1989). 
The resilience and electricity supply can benefit from better harmonization among energy, 
civil protection and critical infrastructure policies. Harmonization does not involve the 
development of a new policy area, rather the alignment of the requirements established 
by each policy, as outlined in the following two recommendations: 
Recommendation 1: Whenever possible, risk assessments should use a consistent set of 
scenarios. 
Using a consistent set of scenarios in the risk assessments required by each policy is 
expected to support the development of collaborative thinking about strategic needs across 
all risk management phases. It would also help public and private organizations involved 
in the energy subsector across all administrative levels to share a common understanding 
of all hazards and threats the power grid faces and the resulting risks. At least one Member 
State has used a consistent set of scenarios to conduct both the National Risk Assessment, 
under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism Council Decision, and the identification of 
critical infrastructure, under the European Critical Infrastructure Directive. The initiative 
was praised as a good practice by the Peer Review exercise that ensued (Falck, 2016). 
At the European level, the seasonal outlooks produced by ENTSO-E on a bi-annual basis 
should consider at least the natural and technological hazards outlined in the Overview of 
Natural and Man-made Disaster Risks (EC, 2017) in the direction of being evolved into a 
full vulnerability analysis, at least for the risks with cross-border impact. The proposed 
Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector could be amended to include a 
similar requirement. At the Member State level, critical infrastructure protection agencies 
could consider requiring identified National Critical Infrastructure Operators to include in 
their OSPs at least the scenarios identified in the National Risk Assessment. 
Recommendation 2: Risk management efforts should be integrated to maximize 
efficiency. 
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Using the same set of scenarios across all risk assessments can provide a common base 
for integrating risk management efforts and making the best of each policy area. For 
example, a Member State’s National Risk Assessment may identify an earthquake scenario. 
Based on this scenario, the National Civil Protection Authority of this Member-State may 
develop a hazard mitigation strategy, eventually supported by an action plan. A TSO may 
use that earthquake scenario to develop its Operator Security Plan. The OSP will likely 
describe the impact of that scenario on the security of electricity supply in further detail 
compared to the NRA. It will also suggest a strategy and action plan for the TSO to reduce 
the risk of disruption of its system. The measures stipulated in the OSP should be 
integrated with the national risk mitigation strategy, to maximize the benefit/cost ratio of 
the interventions and reduce the risk stemming from prolonged power outages to a 
minimum. 
6.2 Hazard mitigation recommendations 
In addition to recommendations related to policy, the findings of this study have 
demonstrated that power grid resilience can benefit from targeted action aimed at 
mitigating the hazard facing the power grid. 
Recommendation 3: Transition from hardening system assets and facilities to building 
resilience into the grid. 
Traditional hazard mitigation strategies have focused on strengthening components of the 
power grid, such as equipment and buildings, based on the expected level of risk. For 
example, if a risk assessment indicates that a substation is exposed to a flood hazard, 
utilities may elevate sensitive equipment and/or buildings, or build a levee to protect the 
substation. However, given the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties of risk assessments, 
hardening measures may be decided based on poor information. For example, a risk 
assessment may use, e.g. a 100-year flood scenario as the basis for a hazard mitigation 
strategy. However, current climate change projections indicate an increased frequency of 
severe hydro-meteorological events (Field et al., 2014). In addition, grid hardening 
measures may be prohibitively expensive or impractical (Abi-Samra, 2013). One example 
is the proposal to bury distribution cables of the State of North Carolina, which was 
estimated to cost nearly six times the net books value of the distribution assets of all State 
DSOs (North Carolina Public Staff Utilities Commission, 2003). The cumulative cost for 
hardening the grid against several hazards would likely be impossible to bear by a single 
utility. 
On the other hand, building resilience into the grid would not focus on preventing damage 
from a single hazard, but rather to enable the System Operator to continue functioning 
when critical parts of the system are taken out of service and promptly return to normal 
operations after a disruption. Resilience requires a change in design to allow the grid to be 
reconfigured in response to various threats and to enhance the speed of repairs. One 
approach is to split a large network in microgrids30 to establish self-sufficient “islands” 
which will remain operational if electricity supply from the larger grid is disrupted. An 
assessment of how long the microgrid will be expected to operate independently is 
necessary. For example, although most of New York was in the dark shortly after Hurricane 
Sandy made landfall, several locations were unaffected because they had backup 
generation capabilities and could operate independently of the main power grid (Abi-
Samra, 2013). In addition, use of smart grid technologies will allow power grid operators 
to automate the process of detecting an outage and reconfiguring the grid to reroute power 
to the affected area through available circuits. Spreading the investment over several fiscal 
years may be a feasible way to finance the design change. Despite the attractiveness of 
                                          
(30) Microgrids are electrical networks which operate either autonomously or inside a larger grid. A microgrid 
needs at least one distributed energy source, such as a backup generator, or energy-storage capabilities, 
such as a battery installation. In case of power outage, these backup energy sources provide power to the 
microgrid and, once the larger grid is back online, they can be disconnected with little or no disruption. 
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the idea, however, its implementation will require extensive operational and regulatory 
changes. 
Recommendation 4: Assess the resilience of the entire European power grid to extreme 
space weather. 
Within the ENTSO-E area, each TSO maintains jurisdiction over their network. Several 
European countries, such as the UK and Sweden, have compiled vulnerability assessments 
of their grids against space weather scenarios (Krausmann et al., 2016). However, because 
most of continental Europe’s transmission systems are interconnected, the GIC-excitation 
from space weather can propagate beyond the initial area of onset and affect countries 
beyond those typically exposed to high GIC risk. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of 
the vulnerability of the European grid against extreme space weather scenarios is 
necessary to improve the understanding of Europe’s risk and help build cost-effective 
resiliency in the European electricity market. 
6.3 Emergency management recommendations 
The findings of this study consistently emphasize the value of disaster preparedness for 
electric utilities. The following recommendations focus on the development of emergency 
plans, stockpiling repair parts and materials, ensuring interoperability, and prioritizing 
repairs to critical customers. 
Recommendation 5: TSOs/DSOs should develop, implement and exercise emergency 
operations plans. These plans should be updated when gaps are identified, e.g. in case of 
climate change. 
The findings of this study have consistently demonstrated the need for System Operators 
to develop, implement and exercise comprehensive outage management plans before 
disaster strikes. Although it was not always clear in this study whether System Operators 
had prepared emergency operations plans, existing arrangements worked systematically 
well. These emergency plans should describe emergency repair and recovery actions, 
assign responsibilities, identify resources, and address coordination and communication 
(Perry, 2007). They should also establish emergency rosters of, including on-call 
arrangements for, qualified personnel available to respond to natural disasters or other 
incidents. In addition, plans should address communications with other responding 
organizations, information management, logistics and communication to customers. The 
use of Outage Management Systems (OMSs) helps to prioritize restoration of power, as 
well as to dispatch, track and manage repair crews (Abi-Samra, 2010). Emergency 
operations plans developed by System Operators need to be integrated and aligned with 
emergency response plans developed by local, regional and national civil protection 
agencies to ensure all disaster- and response-generated demands are covered without 
duplication of effort. The development of a guidance document for emergency planning by 
TSOs and DSOs, which is lacking in Europe, would arguably help to harmonize disaster 
preparedness efforts. Emergency plans should be updated when gaps are identified and to 
take into account changing boundary conditions, e.g. in case of climate change. 
In addition to developing emergency plans, TSO/DSOs should participate in disaster 
exercises. Exercises aim at training personnel and putting emergency response systems to 
the test under realistic conditions. They help assess emergency management systems, and 
identify strengths and areas for improvement. As a rule of thumb, System Operators should 
conduct an internal drill at least once a year to exercise their internal incident management 
system (Abi-Samra, 2010). Also, TSOs/DSOs should participate in local, regional, national 
and international civil protection exercises. DG ECHO should encourage the participation 
of TSOs/DSOs to simulation exercises co-funded by the UCPM Financial Instrument. Last, 
TSOs/DSOs would likely benefit from a comprehensive yearly exercise program, starting 
with one or more training drills using the OMS, followed by an internal functional exercise 
to test their incident management system, and concluding with the participation to a 
regional or national civil protection exercise. 
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Recommendation 6: Stockpile spare items to expedite the repair or replacement of key 
assets and equipment. 
The availability of spares and replacement parts and equipment for critical assets and 
facilities was a critical need throughout this study and often made the difference between 
a speedy and prolonged recovery. Repairs were faster whenever spare parts were readily 
available. For instance, switchyard equipment was always faster to repair, because spare 
parts are less expensive and easier to acquire and store in sufficient quantities. On the 
other hand, repairing or replacing Large Power Transformers was often cited as a major 
challenge. Electric utility companies maintain a stock of spare items to handle daily repairs 
and minor emergencies. Extending these stocks to cover natural disasters and other major 
emergencies is a form of self-insurance and can expedite repairs and ultimately reduce the 
duration of outages. 
Recommendation 7: Ensure interoperability among neighboring TSOs, TSOs and DSOs, 
and between TSOs/DSOs and emergency management organizations. 
Natural disasters and other emergencies may rapidly overwhelm the repair capabilities of 
a single System Operator. Throughout this study, TSOs/DSOs which were severely affected 
by natural disasters requested assistance from neighboring companies. For example, in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, power companies in the affected areas brought in repair 
crews and materials from 23 States and Canada. This speedy mobilization was possible 
because power companies received early warning about the hurricane, had developed and 
exercised internal emergency plans, and had established mutual aid agreements with 
neighboring companies beforehand. Two lessons can be identified from the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. 
First, mutual aid agreements have been an invaluable instrument of resource surge in 
several emergency response mission areas (including rescue and medical care), and can 
arguably help System Operators to rapidly expand their repair capabilities to respond to 
the added requirements of major emergencies. TSOs/DSOs should be encouraged to enter 
mutual aid agreements with other operators in neighboring regions and even Member-
States. However, the rapid surge of capabilities often generates an entirely new set of 
demands. After Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Power had to operate 18 temporary shelters 
for 11,000 staff and 12 logistics sites to manage the extra material. In addition, 
interoperability with external capabilities may be a major concern. For example, when 
freezing rain battered Slovenia in January 2014, over 250,000 people were left without 
power, some for more than 10 days. At the peak of the response, more than 1,500 people 
worked to restore power, including, among others, foreign expert workers. The language 
was an obstacle to effective operations, and foreign workers needed to be led by local 
personnel (OSCE, 2016). Although this case is taken from a different natural hazard than 
those which are the focus of this study, it points out the need for TSOs/DSOs to work with 
neighboring companies to ensure interoperability with mutual aid resources before disaster 
strikes. 
Second, TSOs/DSOs need to maintain interoperability with the emergency management 
community in their area of operation. Ideally, System Operators should participate in 
emergency management committees at least at the national level. By maintaining 
interoperability with the emergency management organization, TSOs/DSOs can streamline 
their risk assessments and preparedness efforts (as discussed in section 6.1 above), 
receive early warning, and rapidly access surge capabilities which would not be available 
otherwise. For example, because Powerlink Queensland (2011) sat in the State Disaster 
Coordination Committee, it had access to daily meteorological briefings, aerial resources 
and boats in the aftermath of the 2011 Queensland, Australia floods. In another example, 
when the Vasilikos Power Plant was destroyed by an explosion in the adjacent Evangelos 
Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus, the Cypriot Government requested generators through the 
then European Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Among others, generators of a total 
capacity of 71 MW were shipped from Greece. Although the generators were sent by Greece 
authorities to their Cyprus counterparts, the logistical and administrative part of the 
operation was handled by the respective Civil Protection National Authorities, and the 
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operation was co-funded by the Civil Protection Financial Instrument of the European 
Commission. 
Recommendation 8: Prioritize repairs to critical customers.  
Critical customers need to be identified before disaster strikes, so that repairs can be 
expedited. Critical clients may include oil and gas refineries, water-treatment plants, 
telecommunication networks, service stations, hospitals, pharmacies and other facilities. 
This needs to be a concerted effort involving the emergency management community, the 
TSO/DSO and critical customers. 
Critical customers should be identified ideally during the development of emergency 
operations plans. The latter should include a list of the critical clients, location, an indication 
of the potential consequences of the outage, the minimum power required to maintain 
functionality, the TSO/DSO, the capabilities of the customer (e.g. backup generator), as 
well as their needs. Planning uncertainty will likely make it impossible to order all 
customers in order of priority before disaster strikes, but the list should at minimum 
indicate which customers need to receive priority during the response and which during 
the recovery phase (DGSCGC, 2015). Table 8 is one example of how such as list could be 
built at the local or regional level. 
Table 8. Example of critical customer table, which may be used at the local or regional level. 
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Source: DGSCGC, 2015 
Once disaster strikes, the list included in the emergency plan can be used to establish 
repair and recovery priorities. This process is likely to be dynamic and priorities will change 
depending on the response and recovery objectives set by decision-makers and emergency 





Abi-Samra, N., Impacts of Extreme Weather Events on Transmission and Distribution 
Systems – Case Histories, Lessons Learned and Good Practices, Volume II, Electric Power 
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 2010. 
Abi-Samra, N. and Henry, W., ‘Actions Before... and After a Flood – Substation Protection 
and Recovery from Weather-Related Water Damage’, IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, 
Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 52-58. 
Abi-Samra, N.C., ‘One Year Later: Superstorm Sandy Underscores Need for a Resilient 
Grid’, IEEE Spectrum, 2013, http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/the-smarter-grid/one-year-
later-superstorm-sandy-underscores-need-for-a-resilient-grid (accessed August 27, 2017) 
Air University, The United States Bombing Surveys (European War – Pacific War), Air 
University Press, Alabama, 1987. 
Auf Der Heide, E., Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination, Mosby, 
St. Louis, MO, 1989. 
Ball, B., ‘Rebuilding Electrical Infrastructure along the Gulf Coast: A Case Study’, The 
Bridge, Vol. 36, Issue, 1, 2006, pp. 21-26. 
Bolduc, L., ‘GIC observations and studies in the Hydro-Quebec power system’, Journal of 
Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics, Vol. 64, 2002, pp. 1793-1802. 
DGSCGC, Guide ORSEC Départemental et Zonal : Mode d’action rétablissement et 
approvisionnement d’urgence des réseaux électricité, communications électroniques, eau, 
gaz hydrocarbures, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Civile et de la Gestion des Crises, 
Paris, 2015. 
DMIS website, 2017, https://www-secure.ifrc.org/DMISII/Pages/00_Home/login.aspx 
(accessed August 7, 2017) 
Eidinger, J.M., Tang, A.K. and Davis, Lushan, Sichuan Province, China Earthquake of 2013 
– Lifeline Performance, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA, 2014, ISBN: 978-
0-7844-1366-1. 
EPRI, The 1986 North Palm Springs Earthquake: Effects on Power Facilities, Electric Power 
Research Institute, San Francisco, CA, 1988. 
EPRI, The December 7, 1988, Armenia Earthquake: Effects on Selected Power, Industrial 
and Commercial Facilities, Electric Power Research Institute, San Francisco, CA, 1991. 
EPRI, Investigtion of the 1999 Kocaeli Turkey Earthquake: Effects on Power and Industrial 
Facilities, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 2001. 
Entergy Corporation, Entergy 2005 Annual Report, 2005, 
http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/e/NYSE_ETR_2005.pdf 
(accessed August 22, 2017) 
EEA, Overview of electricity production and use in Europe, European Environmental 
Agency, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2016, https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/indicators/overview-of-the-electricity-production-2/assessment (accessed July 5, 
2017). 
EC, Commission Staff Working Document: Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for 
Disaster Management, SEC(2010) 1626, European Commission, Brussels, 2010. 
EC, Commission Staff Working Document: Evaluation Report covering the Evaluation of the 
EU's regulatory framework for electricity market design and consumer protection in the 
fields of electricity and gas – Evaluation of the EU rules on measures to safeguard security 
of electricity supply and infrastructure investment (Directive 2005/89), SWD(2016) 412, 
European Commission, Brussels, 2016. 
47 
EC, Commission Staff Working Document: Overview of Natural and Man-made Disaster 
Risks the European Union may face, SWD(2017) 176, European Commission, Brussels, 
2017. 
DG ECHO, The EU Civil Protection Mechanism – 10 years of European Cooperation in 
disaster management, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012, 
ISBN: 978-92-79-23190-2. 
EAC, Annual Report 2011, Electricity Authority of Cyprus, Lefkosia, Cyprus, 2011, 
https://www.eac.com.cy/EN/EAC/FinancialInformation/Documents/2011-%20eng.pdf 
(accessed October 23, 2017) 
EAC, Annual Report 2012, Electricity Authority of Cyprus, Lefkosia, Cyprus, 2012, 
https://www.eac.com.cy/EN/EAC/FinancialInformation/Documents/2012%20-eng.pdf 
(accessed October 23, 2017) 
EAC, Annual Report 2013, Electricity Authority of Cyprus, Lefkosia, Cyprus, 2013, 
https://www.eac.com.cy/EN/EAC/FinancialInformation/Documents/AHK%202013%20EN
GLISH.pdf (accessed October 23, 2017) 
ENTSO-E, Managing critical grid situations – success and challenges: ENTSO-E report of 
the January 2017 cold spell, European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity, Brussels, 2017. 
Eurostat, Statistics explained: Electricity production and supply statistics, 2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Electricity_production_and_supply_statistics (accessed July 5, 2017) 
Falck B.V., Peer Review Risk Assessment – Malta, 2016 
Ferranti, E., Chapman, L. and Whyatt, D., ‘A Perfect Storm? The collapse of Lancaster's 
critical infrastructure networks following intense rainfall on 4/5 December 2015’, Weather, 
Vol. 72, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 3-7. 
Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., 
Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., 
MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R. and White, L.L. (eds.), Climate Change 2014 Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects – Working Group II 
Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Cambridge University press, New York, 2014, ISBN: 978-1-107-64165-5. 
Ganin, A.A., Massaro, E., Gutfraind, A., Steen, N., Keisler, J.M., Kott, A., Mangoubi, R. and 
Linkov, I., ‘Operational resilience: concepts, design and analysis’, Scientific Reports, Vol. 
6, 2016, Article number: 19540, doi: 10.1038/srep19540. 
Gaunt, C.T. and Coetzee, G., ‘Transformer failures in regions incorrectly considered to have 
low GIC-risk’, 2007 IEEE Lausanne Power Tech Conference, 2007, pp. 807-812. 
GDACS website, 2017, http://www.gdacs.org/ (accessed August 7, 2017). 
Huffington Post, ConEd Explosion During Hurricane Sandy Rocks Manhattan’s Lower East 
Side, October 31, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/coned-explosion-
hurricane-sandy-video_n_2044097.html?1351615177 (accessed August 31, 2017). 
Karagiannis, G.M. and Synolakis, C.E., ‘Twenty challenges in incident planning’, Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 14, Issue 2, doi: 10.1515/jhsem-
2016-0061, 2017. 
Kathimerini, The generators from Israel have arrived, July 14, 2011, 
http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/51406/?ctype=ar (accessed October 23, 2017, in 
Greek). 
Krausmann, E., Andersson, E., Murtagh, W. and Mitchison, N., Space Weather and Power 
Grids: Finds and Outlook, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2013, 
ISBN: 978-92-79-34812-9. 
48 
Krausmann, E., Andersson, E., Russell, T. and Murtagh, W., Space Weather and Rail: 
Findings and Outlook, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2015, ISBN: 
978-92-79-52749-4. 
Krausmann, E., Andersson, E., Gibbs, M. and Murtagh, W., Space Weather and Critical 
Infrastructures: Findings and Outlook, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg, 2016, ISBN: 978-92-79-63903-6. 
Krausmann, E., Renni, E., Campedel, M. and Cozzani, V., ‘Industrial accidents triggered by 
earthquakes, floods and lightning: lessons learned from a database analysis’, Natural 
Hazards, Vol. 59, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 285-300. 
MacAlester, M.H. and Murtagh, W., ‘Extreme Space Weather Impact: An Emergency 
Management Perspective’, Space Weather, Vol. 12, 2014, pp. 530-537. 
Manzfield, M. and Linzey, W., Hurricane Sandy Multi-State Outage & Restoration Report, 
2013, 
https://www.naseo.org/Data/Sites/1/documents/committees/energysecurity/documents/
md-sandy-multi-state-outage-report-(february2013).pdf (accessed August 24, 2017) 
McEntire, D.A., Disaster Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics for Resilience, 
Wiley, New York, 2006, ISBN: 0-471-78974-7. 
Miles, S.B., Jagielo, N. and Gallagher, H., ’Hurricane Isaac power outage impacts and 
restoration‘, Journal of Infrastructure Systems, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 2015, paper number 
05015005. 
Naftemporiki. Cyprus: The first electric generators from Greece in operation, August 9, 
2011, 
http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/326403/kupros-se-leitourgia-oi-protes-
ilektrogennitries-apo-tin-ellada (accessed October 23m 2017, in Greek). 
Narasimhan, T.E. and Babu, G., ‘Flood lessons for telecom firms’, Business Standard, 
January 5, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/flood-lessons-for-
telecom-firms-116010501125_1.html (accessed September 4, 2017). 
NBC News, Aftershocks rattle South Pacific nation, May 5, 2006, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12612687/#.WJ38BFUrKUk (accessed September 17, 2017) 
NOAA, Intense Space Weather Storms, October 19-November 07, 2003, National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, MD, 2004, 
https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/SWstorms_assessment.pdf 
(accessed August 28, 2017). 
North Carolina Public Staff Utilities Commission, The feasibility of placing electric 
distribution facilities underground, 2003, 
http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/reports/undergroundreport.pdf (accessed August 
30, 2017) 
OECD, Geomagnetic Storms, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Paris, 2011, http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/46891645.pdf (accessed August 28, 2017) 
OSCE, Protecting Electricity Networks from Natural Hazards, Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, Austria, 2016. 
Petermann, T., Bradke, H., Luellmann, A., Poetzsch, M. and Riehm, U., What happens 
during a blackout: Consequences of a prolonged and wide-ranging power outage, Office of 
Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany, 2011, ISBN 978-3-
7322-9329-2. 
Piccinelli, R. and Krausmann, E., ‘North Europe power transmission system vulnerability 
during extreme space weather’, J Space Weather and Space Climate, in print, 2017. 
Phadke, A.G., ‘Synchronized Phasor Measurements in Power Systems’, IEEE Computer 
Applications in Power, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 1993, pp. 10-15. 
49 
Powerlink Queensland, Transmission Response to 2011 Floods and Cyclones, 2011, 
http://ewh.ieee.org/r10/queensland/v2/lib/exe/fetch.php/chapters:pes:ieee_presentatio
n_-_powerlink_response_to_2011_floods_and_cyclone_yasi_-_july.pdf (accessed August 
10, 2017). 
Ray, S., Swiftwater Rescue, 2nd edition, CFS Press, Asheville, NC, 2013. 
Schiff, A.J. and Buckle, I.G. (eds.), Critical Issues and State-of-the-Art in Lifeline 
Earthquake Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY, 1995, ISBN: 
0-7844-0103-9. 
Schiff, A.J. and Tang, A.K. (eds.), Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake of September 21, 1999 - 
Lifeline Performance, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA, 2000. 
Schmidthaler, M. and Reichl, J., ‘Assessing the socio-economic effects of power outages ad 
hoc’, Computer Science – Research and Development, Vol. 31, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 157-
161. 
Shepard, D.P., Humphreys, T.E. and Fansler, A.A., ‘Going Up Against Time: The Power 
Grid’s Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks’, GPS World, August 1, 2012, 
http://gpsworld.com/wirelessinfrastructuregoing-against-time-13278/ (accessed August 
29, 2012). 
Tang, A.K. and Schiff, A.J. (eds.), Kashiwazaki, Japan Earthquake of July 16, 2007 – Lifeline 
Performance, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA, 2007, ISBN: 978-0-7844-
1062-2. 
Tang, A.K. (ed.), Christchurch, New Zealand, Earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 - Lifeline 
Performance, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA, 2016, ISBN: 978-0-7844-
1421-7. 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Glossary, 2017, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/basic-ref/glossary.html (accessed August 8, 2017) 
US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, 2004.VVA 
Europe and Spark Legal Network, Review of current national rules and practices relating 
to risk preparedness in the area of security of electricity supply (Contract 
ENER/B4/ADM/2015-623/SI2.717165) – Final Report, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2016, doi:10.2832/778934. 
US National Research Council, Severe space weather events – Understanding societal and 
economic impacts: Workshop report, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 
2008, ISBN: 978-0-309-14153-6.Walsh, B., ‘Hurricane Sandy Will Put a Rickety Power Grid 
to the Test’, Time, October 30, 2012, http://science.time.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-
sandy-will-put-a-rickety-power-grid-to-the-test/ (accessed August 31, 2017). 
Wik, M., Pirjola, R., Lundstedt, H., Viljanen, A., Wintoft. And Pulkkinen, A., ‘Space weather 
events in July 1982 and October 2003 and the effects of geomagnetically induced currents 




List of abbreviations and definitions 
AC  Alternating Current 
CACM  Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management 
CME  Coronal Mass Ejection 
DC  Direct Current 
DCS  Distributed Control Systems 
DG  Directorate-General 
DMIS  Disaster Management Information System 
DSO  Distribution System Operator 
EC  European Commission 
ECG  Electricity Coordination Group 
ECHO  Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
ECI  European Critical Infrastructure 
EDG  Emergency Diesel Generator 
EEA  European Environmental Agency 
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
EUCPM  European Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
GDACS  Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System 
GIC  Geomagnetically Induced Current 
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communications 
GSU  Generation Step-Up 
HF  Hugh Frequency 
HVAC  Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 
LPT  Large Power Transformer 
MS  Member State 
NIS  Network and Information Systems 
NRA  National Risk Assessment 
OMS  Outage Management System 
OSP  Operator Security Plan 
PMU  Phasor Measurement Unit 
PTWC  Pacific Tsunami Warning Center 
RES  Renewable Energy Sources 
ROC  Regional Operational Centers 
RSC  Regional Security Coordinators 
SCADA  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SO  System Operation 
51 
SVC  Static VAR Compensator 
TETRA  Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
TSO  Transmission System Operator 
UCPM  Union Civil Protection Mechanism (formerly EUCPM) 
VAR  Volt-Ampere Reactive 
52 
List of boxes 
Box 1. The proposal for a Regulation on risk-preparedness in electricity sector ............. 9 
 
53 
List of figures 
Figure 1. Overview of the traditional electric power system ....................................... 5 
Figure 2. 2016 EU-28 Electricity Generation Profile .................................................. 6 
Figure 3. Distribution of damage severity per damage level (based on a sample of 39 
facilities) ........................................................................................................... 19 
Figure 4. Distribution of damage severity per damage level (based on a sample of 14 
events) ............................................................................................................. 22 
Figure 5. Power grid recovery timeline following the 1989 Quebec blackout ............... 23 
Figure 6. Restoration of power in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (in 
thousands) ........................................................................................................ 25 
Figure 7. Left: Power supplied by Taipower in the aftermath of the September 1999, 
Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake, as a percentage of the power supplied before the 
earthquake). Right: Number of power outages reported after Hurricane Sandy landfall. 30 
Figure 8. Power grid recovery timeline following the 2011 explosion at the Evangelos 
Florakis Naval Base, Cyprus ................................................................................. 32 
 
54 
List of tables 
Table 1. Data recorded ...................................................................................... 13 
Table 2. Estimated repair time ............................................................................ 18 
Table 3. Earthquake damage and failure modes ..................................................... 19 
Table 4. Electrical equipment GIC damage and failure modes .................................. 21 
Table 5. Substation equipment flood damage and failure modes .............................. 26 
Table 6. Overview of damage types and natural hazard impacts on the power grid ..... 29 
Table 7. Impact of earthquakes, space weather events and floods on critical 
infrastructure sectors other than the power grid ..................................................... 34 
Table 8. Example of critical customer table, which may be used at the local or regional 
level. ................................................................................................................ 45 
Table 9. Earthquakes reviewed in this study .......................................................... 55 
Table 10. Space weather events reviewed in this study .......................................... 56 




This annex includes a list of the natural disasters reviewed in this study. Earthquakes are 
listed in Table 9, space weather events in Table 10 and floods in Table 11.  
 
Table 9. Earthquakes reviewed in this study 
Date Country Epicenter Magnitude 
(Mw) 
July 8, 1986 USA Palm Springs 5.9 (ML) 
October 10, 1986 El Salvador San Salvador 5.6 (ML) 
October 1, 1987 USA Whittier, CA 5.9 (ML) 
December 7, 1988 Armenia Spitak 6,7 
October 19, 1989 USA Loma Prieta, CA 7,1 
August 17, 1999 Turkey Kocaeli 7,4 
September  21, 
1999 
Taiwan Chi-Chi 7,3 
May 4, 2006 Tonga 100 mi NE of Nuku'alofa 7,9 
July 16, 2007 Japan Niigataken-Chuetsu-Oki 6,7 
May 12, 2008 China Wenchuan 7,9 
September 4, 2010 New Zealand Christchurch 7,1 
February 22, 2011 New Zealand Christchurch 6,3 
March 11, 2011 Japan Tohoku 9 
June 13, 2011 New Zealand Christchurch 6 
December 23, 2011 New Zealand Christchurch 5,9 
April 20, 2013 China Luchan, Sichuan Province 6,6 
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Table 10. Space weather events reviewed in this study 
Start Date End Date Affected Countries 
13-May-1921 16-May-1921 US, Europe 
23-Feb-1956 23-Feb-1956 (observed in) Royal Greenwich 
Observatory 
11-Feb-1958 11-Feb-1958 Sweden 
28-Aug-1859 04-Sep-1859 Worldwide 
13-Nov-1960 13-Nov-1960 Sweden 
13-Jul-1982 14-Jul-1982 Sweden 
8-Feb-1986 9-Feb-1986 Sweden 
13-Mar-1989 14-Mar-1989 USA, Canada, Sweden, UK 
24-Mar-1991 24-Mar-1991 Canada, Sweden 
28-Oct-1991 28-Oct-1991 Canada 
9-Nov-1991 9-Nov-1991 Sweden 
6-Apr-2000 7-Apr-2000 UK 
6-Nov-2001 6-Nov-2001 New Zealand 
19-Oct-2003 7-Nov-2003 USA, Sweden, South Africa 

















Table 11. Floods reviewed in this study 
Date Country Location 
1988 Bangladesh  
June-August 1993 USA St. Louis, MO metropolitan area 
1998 Bangladesh Dhaka 
September 2000 Japan Nagoya (Typhoon Saomai) 
August 2002 Czech Republic Prague 
August 2004 Bangladesh Dhaka 
August-September 
2005  
USA Louisiana and Mississippi 
(Hurricane Katrina) 
August 2007 South Asian floods Bangladesh 
December 2007 USA Pacific NW 
September 2008 USA Louisiana (Hurricane Gustav) 
September 2008 USA Texas (Hurricane Ike) 
December 2010 – 
January 2011 
Australia Queensland 
September 2011 Japan Tokyo (Typhoon Roke) 
August 2012 USA Louisiana (Hurricane Isaac) 
October-November 
2012  
USA Mid-Atlantic States & New 
England (Hurricane Sandy) 
May-June 2013 Czech Republic Various 
November-December 
2015 
India Chennai (or Madras) 
December 2015 UK Lancaster 
July 2017 USA Illinois (Lake Forest) 
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